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INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO V. 
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE: LIMITING 
OSHA'S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE WORKPLACE 
CARCINOGENS UNDER THE OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 
Vincent C. Baird* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
By enacting the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the 
Act),l Congress sought "to assure so far as possible" that working 
conditions in America will be "safe and healthful."2 To achieve that 
end, the Act empowers the Secretary of Labor to promulgate "man-
datory occupational safety and health standards,"3 and requires that 
employers comply with those standards. 4 
The exercise of this standard-setting authority has proven to be 
particularly troublesome when the Secretary has attempted to set 
permissible levels for employee exposure to carcinogenic sub-
stances.5 The difficulties inherent in regulating occupational carcino-
gens stem primarily from the fact that the scientific community has 
yet to answer many of the questions about cancer. Specifically, safe 
exposure levels to carcinogens, if they exist, cannot presently be as-
certained.6 When the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA) tries to ensure that workplaces are safe and healthful by 
• Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). 
2. Id. § 651(b). 
3. Id. § 651(b)(3). Under the Act, the Secretary is authorized to set occupational safety and 
health standards. This authority has been delegated to the Assistant Secretary for Occupation-
al Safety and Health, who is the head of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA). Hereafter this article will use "the Secretary" and "OSHA" interchangeably. 
4. Id. S 654(b). 
5. The regulatory dilemma created by occupational carcinogens is considered in detail in 
Section IV of this article. 
6. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148 (1977). 
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regulating occupational exposure to carcinogens, the agency must 
necessarily act without complete or conclusive data. 
Recognizing both the deficiency of scientific knowledge and the 
need for effective regulation, the Secretary proposed in 19777 a 
generic approach to the identification, classification, and regulation 
of toxic substances which exhibit a carcinogenic potential. This ap-
proach incorporates those policy judgments which the Secretary has 
repeatedly used to set standards for occupational carcinogens. 
Essentially, the approach requires that whenever a substance is 
identified as carcinogenic, the Secretary is to set the permissible ex-
posure limit "as low as feasible."s Under the generic approach, the 
Secretary is not obliged to estimate the risk of cancer created by low-
level exposure to the occupational carcinogen under consideration. 
While reviewing OSHA standards based on inconclusive factual 
records, the courts have attempted to identify the factual determina-
tions the Secretary must make in order to validly promulgate a 
regulation. The circuit courts which have addressed this issue have 
sent conflicting signals to the Secretary. When the Secretary pro-
mulgates a lower standard for occupational exposure to a car-
cinogen, he is obliged to consider the health benefits (i.e., lives saved 
or cancers prevented) that are likely to be achieved by the standard 
If the record on which he bases the lower standard is incomplete and 
inconclusive, the Secretary would ordinarily be unable to make even 
a rough estimation of the extent of the expected benefits. Of the four 
circuit courts which have reviewed OSHA standards for occupa-
tional carcinogens, the District of Columbia, the Second, and the 
Third Circuits had allowed the Secretary to regulate even though he 
could not estimate the expected benefits.9 The Fifth Circuit, 
however, had broken with this pattern and found that the Secretary 
must provide a rough but educated estimate of the expected benefits 
in order to validly promulgate a standard. 
In American Petroleum Institute v. Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, the Fifth Circuit considered an industry 
petition challenging the validity of the Secretary's regulation which 
reduced the permissible exposure limit for benzene. After concluding 
that exposure to benzene created a leukemia hazard, the Secretary 
had reduced the permissible exposure limit from 10 parts benzene 
7. This policy for regulating occupational carcinogens became effective April 21, 1980. 45 
Fed. Reg. 5,002 (1980). 
8. OSHA's Proposed Rule on the Identification, Classification and Regulation of Toxic 
Substances Posing a Potential Carcinogenic Risk, 29 C.F.R. § 1990.101 (1980). 
9. These circuit court decisions are considered in detail in Section V of this article. 
1981] WORKPLACE CARCINOGENS 625 
per million parts of air (10 ppm) to 1 ppm. The Fifth Circuit set aside 
the lower standard, finding that the Secretary had not made the 
necessary estimate of the benefits expected from the 1 ppm stand-
ard. 10 
On writ of certiorari, the case went to the Supreme Court. In In-
dustrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum In-
stitute,ll the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision. Chief Justice 
Burger, and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Powell determined that 
the Act requires the Secretary to make a threshold finding that ex-
posure to a toxic substance at the present permissible limit poses a 
significant risk of harm. These Justices concluded that in pro-
mulgating the 1 ppm standard for benzene, the Secretary exceeded 
his statutory authority because he did not find that exposure to 
benzene at a 10 ppm level creates a significant risk of harm. 
Justices Marshall, Brennan, White, and Blackmun vigorously 
dissented. They found nothing in the Act to support the requirement 
of a threshold finding. Instead, they determined that the Secretary 
was within his statutory authority when he promulgated the 1 ppm 
standard for benzene. The dissent concluded that the 1 ppm stand-
ard was sufficiently supported by the Secretary's finding that the 
reduction in occupational exposure would achieve some health 
benefits. 
In the case, the Supreme Court did not directly consider the validi-
ty of OSHA's generic approach to the regulation of workplace car-
cinogens. However, if future courts follow the lead of the four 
Justices who required a threshold finding of significant risk, the 
ability of the Secretary to use the generic approach may be undercut. 
The objective of this article is to analyze the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American 
Petroleum Institute, with an eye toward assessing its potential effect 
on the Secretary's generic approach to regulating occupational car-
cinogens. First, the article will discuss the purpose of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, and cite sections 3(8) and 6(bX5) of the 
Act, the two provisions the Supreme Court was called on to con-
strue. Second, the article will provide background information about 
benzene, as well as describe the Secretary's permanent standard of 1 
ppm which gave rise to the controversy considered by the Supreme 
Court. Third, the article will outline OSHA's generic approach to the 
10. American Petroleum Institute v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 581 
F.2d 493, 505 (5th Cir. 1978). 
11. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
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regulation of occupational carcinogens. Fourth, the article will ex-
amine the split between the District of Columbia, the Second, and 
the Third Circuits on one hand, and the Fifth Circuit on the other. 
This split centered on the question whether the Act requires the 
Secretary to estimate the expected benefits prior to promulgating a 
standard. Fifth, the article will analyze the Supreme Court's decision 
in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum 
Institute. This analysis will focus on the two issues which divided the 
plurality and the dissent: (1) whether section 3(8) applies to section 
6(bX5) and requires the Secretary to make a threshold finding of 
significant risk prior to regulation; and (2) whether Congress intend-
ed that the Secretary regulate only significant risks under the Act. 
Finally, the article will conclude with a consideration of the effect 
that this Supreme Court decision may have on OSHA regulation of 
occupational carcinogens. 
II. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 
In 1951, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey introduced in Congress a 
bill which called for uniform national health and safety codes. The 
bill was eventually abandoned, as were other bills of the same type 
introduced during the next ten to twelve years. While none of these 
efforts resulted in a piece of legislation, they did indicate a growing 
awareness on Congress' part that the federal government would 
have to assume a leading role if health and safety standards for in-
dustry were to be improved. 12 
The need for this improvement was obvious. Statistics compiled in 
the late 1960's indicated that hazardous workplace conditions were 
exacting a staggering toll on American society .13 Before the federal 
government stepped in, the states had the responsibility of ensuring 
that workplaces were safe. However, state programs throughout the 
country varied widely in their scope and effectiveness, and these dif-
ferences were increasing as the years went by,14 
In 1970, Congress finally succeeded in passing a comprehensive 
12. THE JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, BNA OPERATIONS MANUAL 15-16 (1971). 
13. In his August 6, 1969 message to Congress, President Nixon indicated that "every year 
in this country some fourteen thousand deaths can be attributed to workplace related injuries 
or illnesses." President Nixon also noted that "accidents or diseases sustained on the job" 
cause the loss of "some 250 million man-days of labor" each year. He stated that these losses 
have great economic consequences: "The economy loses millions of dollars in unrealized 
production and millions more must be used to pay workmen's compensation benefits and 
medical expenses." 115 CONGo REC. 22,510 (1969). 
14. [d. 
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bill designed to address the problem of hazardous workplace condi-
tions. On December 29, 1970, President Nixon signed the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act into law.15 The Act's purpose is to 
"assure so far as possible"16 that working conditions are safe and 
healthful throughout the country. To fulfill that purpose, the Act 
authorizes the Secretary of Labor to set occupational safety and 
health standards for all businesses which affect interstate com-
merce. 17 The Act requires compliance with OSHA standards,18 and 
subjects non-complying employers to civil and criminal penalties.19 
The legislative history of the Act evidences Congress' concern 
with the threat to worker health created by the occupational use of 
toxic chemicals and new technologies. In the report of the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,20 it was noted that: 
Other materials long in industrial use are only now being dis-
covered to have toxic effects. In addition, technological ad-
vances and new processes in American industry have brought 
numerous new hazards to the workplace. Carcinogenic 
chemicals . . . present incipient threats to the health of 
workers. Indeed, new materials and processes are being in-
troduced into industry at a much faster rate than the present 
meager resources of occupational health can keep up with. It is 
estimated that every 20 minutes a new and potentially toxic 
chemical is introduced into industry. New processes and new 
sources of energy present occupational health problems of un-
precedented complexity. 
Recent scientific knowledge points to hitherto unsuspected 
cause-and-effect relationships between occupational exposure 
and many of the so-called chronic diseases-cancer. . . . 21 
On the Senate floor, Senator Harrison Williams22 reported that a 
strong concern over employee exposure to toxic materials surfaced 
throughout the subcommittee hearings. He indicated that the Act 
was intended to effectively protect workers from the increasingly 
dangerous threat created by chemical and physical hazards in the 
workplace.23 
Like its Senate counterpart, the report of the House Committee on 
15. 29 u.s.c. §§ 651-678 (1976). 
16. [d. § 651(b). 
17. [d. § 651(b)(3). 
18. [d. § 654(a)(2). 
19. [d. § 666. 
20. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
21. [d. at 2-3. 
22. (D.-N.J.). 
23. 116 CONGo REC. 37,326 (1970). 
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Education and Labor24 was concerned with the large number of new 
workplace chemicals whose properties and health effects are not ful-
ly understood.26 During the House debate, statements were made 
which dealt specifically with the need for greater protection of 
workers against the health hazards created by the occupational use 
of toxic chemicals.26 This congressional concern is manifested in the 
Act itself. Section 6(b)(5) requires that whenever toxic materials are 
regulated, the Secretary must "set the standard which most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will 
suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity."27 
24. H.R. REP No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
25. The House report stated that as "occupational health research becomes more sophisti· 
cated," the toxicity of "chemicals to which workers are exposed will be discovered." [d. at 
14-16. 
26. Representative Dominick Daniels (D.-N.J.) indicated that state laws were particularly 
inadequate with regard to the regulation of "the insidious 'silent' killers such as toxic fumes, 
bases, acids, and chemicals." 116 CONGo REc. 38,376 (1970). Representative Morris Udall 
(D.-Ariz.) noted that a major preoccupation of Congress was with the "whole area of the indus-
trial consumption of chemicals and. . . the occupational diseases" which are caused by these 
chemicals. Representative Udall argued that "we had better learn more about the chemicals 
and other substances which are being used in increasing numbers and variety in the production 
processes of this country, especially whether or not they are toxic." He concluded that "we 
urgently need more regulation of these products and greater prevention of their abuse," in 
order to narrow the "unconscionable gap between the minimal protection being given to 
several million workers regularly exposed to the gases, dusts, and mists of American industry, 
and the protection they need." 116 CONGo REC. 38,391 (1970). 
27. 29 U.S.C. S 655(b)(5) (1976). This provision states: 
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful 
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately 
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such 
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the 
period of his working life. Development of standards under this subsection shall be 
based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as 
may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of health and 
safety protection for the employee, other considerations shall be the latest available 
scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the standards, and experience gained 
under this and other health and safety laws. Whenever practicable, the standard pro-
mulgated shall be expressed in terms of objective criteria and of the performance 
desired. 
This provision appears in the section of the Act which describes the three types of standards 
the Secretary is authorized to issue. These three types of standards are: national consensus 
standards and established federal standards; emergency temporary standards; and permanent 
standards. 
Section 3(9) of the Act defines a national consensus standard as: 
[A]ny occupational safety and health standard or modification thereof which (1) has 
been adopted and promulgated by a nationally recognized standards-producing 
organization under procedures whereby it can be determined by the Secretary that 
persons interested and affected by the scope or provisions of the standard have 
reached substantial agreement on its adoption, (2) was formulated in a manner which 
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The Supreme Court decision in Industrial Union Department, 
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute turned not only on an in-
terpretation of section 6(b)(5), but also on an interpretation of sec-
tion 3(8). That latter provision defines an occupational safety and 
health standard as a standard which is "reasonably necessary or ap-
propriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of 
employment."28 The split in the Supreme Court resulted from the 
fact that the plurality and the dissent reached different conclusions 
concerning the meaning of and relationship between sections 3(8) 
and 6(b)(5). 
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American 
Petroleum Institute, the Court considered the validity of the Secre-
tary's 1 ppm standard for occupational exposure to benzene. In 
order to provide the background needed to understand the Court's 
decision, the following section of this article will outline the health 
hazards created by benzene exposure, and the Secretary's 
regulatory attempt to reduce those hazards. 
afforded an. opportunity for diverse views to be considered and (3) has been 
designated as such a standard by the Secretary, after consultation with other ap-
propriate Federal agencies. 
29 U.S.C. § 652(9) (1976). 
Section 3(10) defines an established federal standard as: 
[A]ny operative occupational safety and health standard established by any agency of 
the United States and presently in effect, or contained in any Act of Congress in force 
on December 29,1970. 
[d. § 652(10). 
Section 6(a) gave the Secretary the authority, during the first two years of the Act's ex-
istence, to adopt as an occupational safety or health standard any preexisting national consen-
sus standard or established federal standard. The American National Standards Institute, Inc. 
and the National Fire Protection Association, two private organizations, are the major sources 
of national consensus standards. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976). See note 52 infra. 
Section 6(c), 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1976), authorizes the Secretary to issue emergency tem-
porary standards, which take immediate effect upon publication in the Federal Register. The 
Secretary must first determine that occupational exposure to the substance poses a grave 
danger to workers, and that the standard is necessary to protect workers from that danger. 
These standards may remain effective no longer than six months. 
Section 6(b), id. § 655(b), describes the rule making procedure the Secretary is to follow as he 
sets permanent standards which either supersede those standards adopted under § 6(a) or 
regulate any area for which standards had not previously existed. Section 6(b) generally pro-
vides that the Secretary is to promulgate rules "in order to serve the objectives of this 
chapter." [d. § 655(b)(1). Section 6(b)(5) describes the requirements the Secretary must meet 
when he sets standards for toxic materials or harmful physical agents. 
28. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976). Section 3(8) states that, "for the purposes of this chapter": 
the term "occupational safety and health standard" means a standard which requires 
conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, opera-
tions, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful 
employment and places of employment. 
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III. BENZENE: ITS PROPERTIES, USES, HEALTH 
EFFECTS, AND REGULATORY HISTORY 
A. Benzene's Properties and Industrial Uses 
[Vol. 9:623 
A highly flammable liquid with a strong, rather pleasant odor, 
benzene is a hydrocarbon compound (C6H6) which has a low boiling 
point and high vapor pressure.29 It therefore evaporates rapidly 
under ordinary atmospheric conditions. Workers absorb benzene 
primarily by inhaling its vapors.30 
The petrochemical and petroleum refining industries produce 94 
percent of the benzene produced in America by a process called 
catalytic reformation. 31 The remainder is produced as a by-product 
of the coking process used in steel mills.32 Benzene production has 
already reached a high level and shows no sign of slowing down. In 
1976, approximately 11 billion pounds of the chemical were pro-
duced. 33 
The list of industries using benzene includes the chemical, print-
ing, lithograph, rubber cements, rubber fabricating, paint, varnish, 
stain removers, adhesives, and petroleum industries.34 Benzene's 
first major industrial use was in the rubber industry just prior to 
World War I. Currently, most of the benzene produced is used as a 
feedstock or intermediate in the production of other organic 
chemicals. 35 Such products as plastics, artificial fibers, and rubber 
are derived from benzene. 36 Along with its industrial uses, benzene is 
often present in chemical laboratories, where it is used as a solvent 
and reactant in many chemical applications. 37 
29. Emergency Temporary Standard for Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 42 Fed. Reg. 
22,516, 22,517 (1977). 
30. [d. See also 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,920 (1978). 
31. [d. at 5,918. Catalytic reformation "converts certain lower octane hydrocarbons into 
higher octane aromatics." [d. 
32. [d. 
33. [d. "Only eleven other chemicals and only one other hydrocarbon (ethylene)" are pro-
duced in greater amounts in the country. [d. 
34. [d. 
35. [d. Approximately 86% of the benzene produced is used as an intermediate in the pro-
duction of other organic chemicals. These chemicals include styrene, phenol, and cyclohexane. 
36. Brief for Respondents at 6, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American 
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). The manufacture of detergents, pesticides, solvents, 
and paint removers consumes most of the remainder of the benzene. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918 
(1978). 
37. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918 (1978). There are small quantities of benzene in the ambient air. 
These quantities range from a few parts per billion parts of air to 0.5 ppm. 448 U.S. 607, 615 
(1980) (plurality opinion). See Brief for Federal Parties at 9, Industrial Union Department, 
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
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B. The HealtkHazards Created by Benzene Exposure 
Since 1900, benzene has been known as a toxic substance which 
can produce acute or chronic effects. When benzene vapors are in-
haled, the benzene diffuses rapidly through the lungs and is quickly 
absorbed into the blood.38 If an individual is exposed to high concen-
trations of benzene, an almost immediate reaction occurs in the cen-
tral nervous system. In fact, if the concentration is near 20,000 ppm, 
death can occur within minutes as a result of an acute circulatory 
failure or coma.39 Inhalation of milder concentrations of benzene can 
produce a period of nervous excitation, euphoria, headache, and 
nausea. This can be followed by a period of depression which may 
result in cardiovascular collapse and/or unconsciousness. The linger-
ing effects, which may last up to several weeks after exposure, in-
clude breathlessness, nervous irritability, and unsteadiness in walk-
ing.40 
Other acute effects of benzene exposure at still lower concentra-
tions (250-500 ppm) have been observed. At this level, the signs and 
symptoms of mild poisoning appear, including vertigo, drowsiness, 
headache, and nausea. Once exposure ceases, these symptoms quick-
ly disappear. 41 
Chronic exposure to low concentrations of benzene has been found 
to produce non-malignant blood disorders.42 Chronic exposure above 
the 25-40 ppm range may lead to bone marrow toxicity, resulting in 
blood deficiencies and potentially fatal diseases of the blood-forming 
organs.43 Scientific data has not yet demonstrated if these adverse 
health effects can be caused by exposure to benzene below 20 ppm.44 
In addition, scientific evidence has established that chronic exposure 
38. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,920 (1978). 
39. [d. at 5,921. 
40. [d. 
41. [d. 
42. [d. Benzene attacks the hematopoietic (blood-forming) systems, particularly the bone 
marrow, and thus causes alterations in the level of formed elements in the circulating blood. 
Chronic exposure to benzene commonly causes a decrease in the levels of red blood cells, white 
blood cells, and platelets; these declines are called anemia, leukopenia, and thrombacytopenia, 
respectively. Depending in part on the severity of the decline, these decreased blood counts 
may result in overt physical symptoms. Anemia may cause a person to appear pale and to be 
weak and easily fatigued. Leukopenia renders a person prone to recurrent infections. Throm-
bacytopenia can impair blood-clotting, which may be manifested as easy bruising, nosebleeds 
and hemorrhage. [d. 
43. [d. at 5,924. When all three formed elements (red and white blood cells and platelets) of 
the circulating blood are depressed, the result can be pancytopenia or aplastic anemia, non-
cancerous diseases that can prove fatal. [d. at 5,922. 
44. [d. at 5,925. 
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to benzene is causally related to the development of leukemia.45 As 
early as 1928, evidence suggested that a leukemia risk accompanies 
occupational exposure to benzene. Epidemiological studies46 pub-
lished in the late 1960's and early 1970's indicate that benzene ex-
posure creates a significantly increased risk of leukemia. 4 7 However, 
because the available data does not include levels of exposure, the 
particular exposure levels for benzene which pose an increased risk 
of leukemia cannot be identified.48 
c. Benzene's Regulatory History 
Because of these and other49 adverse health effects traced to the 
occupational presence of benzene, its history has been characterized 
by increasingly stringent regulation. Since 1946, the American Con-
ference of Government Hygienists (ACGIH) has repeatedly reduced 
its recommended level of occupational exposure to benzene. 50 Some 
45. [d. Leukemia is a cancer of the white blood cells. Its characteristics are: "the appearance 
of abnormal, immature white cells in the circulating blood; diffuse and almost total replace-
ment of the bone marrow with the leukemic cells; and widespread infiltrates of the liver, 
spleen, and other tissues, analogous to metastatic dissemination of solid tissue cancer." [d. 
Industry did not challenge the conclusion that there was an evidentiary basis for the finding 
"that exposure to high benzene concentration (in excess of 100 ppm) can cause leukemia." 
Brief for Respondents at 8, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum 
Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). Industry's primary contention was that a threshold or safe ex-
posure level existed for benzene. Industry argued that because there were no studies in-
dicating a leukemia risk below 100 ppm and because negative studies had indicated no excess 
incidence of leukemia among workers exposed to low concentrations of benzene, the safe ex-
posure level was well in excess of 10 ppm. [d. at 16. 
46. An epidemiological study begins with the scientist's selection of a group ("cohort") of 
workers who have been exposed to a chemical for a period of years. The scientist then com-
pares the number of cancers which occurred in that group of workers with the number of 
cancers which occurred in a similar group that had no exposure to the chemical. By way of this 
comparison, the scientist determines if exposure to the chemical is associated with the devel-
opment of cancers. Brief for Federal Parties at 11 n.11, Industrial Union Department, AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). See McGarity, Substantive and 
Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating 
Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 741 n.57 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 
McGarity]. 
47. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,925-32 (1978). 
48. [d. at 5,927. 
49. In addition to the health risks noted in the text, the Secretary of Labor has noted that 
"studies reveal that there are statistically significant increases in chromosomal damage in 
those occupationally exposed to benzene." [d. at 5,932. 
50. In 1946, ACGIH recommended a threshold limit value (TLV) of 100 ppm for benzene ex-
posure. In 1947, the TLV was lowered to 50 ppm; and in 1948, following Massachusetts'lead, 
it was reduced to 35 ppm. ACGIH proposed a TLV of 25 ppm in 1963. This reduction was 
based on benzene's nonmalignant blood effects, since no mention was made of the leukemia 
hazard created by benzene exposure. In 1974, ACGIH adopted the American National Stand-
ards Institute (ANSI) standard of 10 ppm. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,919 (1978). 
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states have been active in benzene regulation as well. In Massachu-
setts, for example, the permissible exposure limit for benzene has 
been periodically lowered since 1934 as evidence of the chemical's 
toxicity has accumulated. 51 
In 1969, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI),52 a 
private, non-profit organization which promulgates national consen-
sus standards for voluntary use, set a standard of 10 ppm. One year 
after enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the 
Secretary adopted the ANSI standard without rulemaking, pursuant 
to section 6(a) of the Act.53 The 10 ppm standard was not based on 
the leukemia risk created by benzene exposure, but on the need to 
reduce the risk of non-malignant blood disorders. 54 
In 1974, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH)55 reported that benzene's potential for causing leukemia 
must not be disregarded. Still, NIOSH did not recommend a reduc-
tion of the permissible exposure limit (then at 10 ppm), primarily 
because there was no conclusive proof that benzene was car-
cinogenic.56 
Epidemiological studies appeared between 1974 and 1976 in-
dicating that occupational exposure to benzene presented a statistic-
ally significant risk of leukemia. 57 Having reviewed this data, 
51. By 1934, benzene toxicity in the shoe leather industries of Massachusetts was a serious 
problem. Consequently, the state's Department of Labor founded a Division of Occupational 
Hygiene. The Division reduced the maximum acceptable limit (MAC) of benzene exposure to 
75 ppm in 1934. This limit was reduced to 35 ppm in 1948. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918 (1978). See In-
dustrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 617 
(1980) (plurality opinion). 
52. Along with the National Fire Protection Association, ANSI is the major source of na-
tional consensus standards. ANSI standards are promulgated for voluntary use, but many of 
them have been incorporated into local, state, and national law and regulation. ANSI is a 
private, voluntary, non-profit organization. It includes representatives from scientific, tech-
nical, trade, professional, consumer, and labor organizations. ANSI also has some 900 individ-
ual companies as company members. These companies are not directly involved in standards 
development or approval; they have direct votes on policy matters only. They provide financial 
support, but ANSI imposes a limit on each company's contribution. Less then 50% of ANSI's 
operating budget comes from industry and member organizations. The rest comes from sales 
of standards and from special projects. THE JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, BNA 
OPERATIONS MANUAL 29-30 (1971). 
53. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,919 (1978). 
Section 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976), permitted promulgation of national consensus stand-
ards and established Federal standards during the first two years of the Act by way of an in-
formal, shortened rulemaking procedure. See note 27 supra. 
54. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,919 (1978). 
55. NIOSH was established by the Act to aid the Secretary in the regulation of toxic 
materials and harmful physical agents. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1) (1976). 
56. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,919 (1978). 
57. [d. at 5,926-30. 
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NIOSH updated and revised its criteria document of 1974. In August 
1976, it concluded that benzene must be considered carcinogenic, 
and therefore recommended reduction of occupational exposure to 1 
ppm, the lowest feasible level. 58 As a result, the Secretary of Labor 
issued in January 1977 voluntary "Guidelines for Control of Occupa-
tional Exposure to Benzene," which requested that exposure be 
restricted to 1 ppm whenever possible. 59 
Also in January, NIOSH reported that it was about to conduct an 
epidemiological study of benzene's health effects on the basis of data 
collected from workplaces in St. Mary's and Akron, Ohio.60 In those 
workplaces, employees in adequate numbers had been exposed to 
benzene for a period of years. The study's preliminary findings61 
indicated that for the workers exposed to benzene from 1940 to 
1949, there was at least a five-times greater incidence of leukemia 
deaths than would be expected.62 This new evidence prompted the 
Secretary to issue an Emergency Temporary Standard for Occupa-
tional Exposure to Benzene on May 3, 1977.63 
This standard, which reduced exposure to 1 ppm, was scheduled to 
take effect on May 21, 1977. Several petitions for review of the 
standard were filed immediately. 54 On May 19,65 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit entered a temporary restraining order 
against the standard. Abandoning the emergency temporary stand-
ard, the Secretary instead issued a proposed permanent standard for 
benzene exposure.66 The proposed standard was essentially the same 
as the emergency standard.67 After public hearings on the proposal, 
the permanent standard appeared on February 10, 1978.68 
58. [d. at 5,919. 
59. [d. 
60. [d. The worksite was a manufacturing plant owned by the Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company; the plant used benzene at various stages in the production of plio film. Pliofilm was a 
type of plastic food-wrapping material produced until the 1960's. 
61. The study's preliminary conclusions were conveyed to the Secretary on April 15, 1977. 
[d. 
62. [d. at 5,927. 
63. Emergency Temporary Standard for Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 42 Fed. Reg. 
22,516 (1977). 
64. Brief for Federal Parties at 12 n.13, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. 
American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
65. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 
623 (1980) (plurality opinion). The date cited in 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,919 (1978) was May 20, 
1977. 
66. Permanent Standard for Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 
(1980). 
67. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 
623 (1980) (Plurality opinion). See Brief for Respondents at 12. 
68. Public hearings on the proposal began on July 19,1977, and were concluded on August 
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The permanent standard mandated a reduction in benzene ex-
posure to no more than 1 ppm in the air, averaged over eight hours, 
or to no more than 5 ppm, averaged over fifteen minutes.69 In addi-
tion to having to implement engineering and other controls to affect 
this reduction, employers were required to monitor workplaces to 
ascertain the existing exposure levels, and to advise employees of 
these levels. 70 Medical examinations were to be conducted by the 
employer whenever the exposure level exceeded 0.5 ppm.71 The 
standard also required labeling of products which contained benzene, 
and imposed stringent limitations on employee exposure to liquid 
benzene. 72 The standard did not apply to the sale, discharge, storage, 
transportation, distribution, or use as a fuel of gasoline and other 
fuels after they have been discharged from bulk terminals. 73 
The Secretary justified the reduction in occupational exposure to 
benzene by the following rationale. The evidence in the record estab-
lished that benzene can cause non-malignant blood disorders and 
leukemia. However, the evidence neither permitted the Secretary to 
determine a specific exposure level for benzene that was safe, nor 
answered the question whether a safe level existed at all. Because 
benzene created a leukemia risk which could exist at any exposure 
level above 0 ppm, and because the Secretary read section 6(b )(5) of 
the Act to require maximum protection of worker health, the 
Secretary concluded that ideally the permissible exposure limit 
should be 0 ppm. Since a 0 ppm limit was not technologically feasible, 
1 ppm was selected as the level closest to 0 ppm that could be 
achieved by industry. 74 
The Secretary also reached a conclusion concerning the economic 
10, 1977. Ninety-five witnesses testified, including employers and employer associations from 
a number of industries, as well as representatives of workers occupationally exposed to ben-
zene. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,919 (1978). Over fifty volumes of exhibits and testimony were 
gathered. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 
607,696 (1980) (dissenting opinion). 
69. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028(c)(1) (1980). 
70. [d. § 1910.1028(e) (1980). 
71. [d. § 1910.1028(i) (1980). 
72. [d. § 1910.1028(c)(2), (k) (1980). This aspect of the permanent standard was also chal-
lenged by industry. Since the Supreme Court did not consider this challenge in much detail, it 
will receive no attention in this article. 
73. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,941 (1978). Justice Stevens called this a "particularly significant" 
exception to the permanent standard, because it meant that "over 795,000 gas station 
employees, who are exposed to an average of 102,700 gallons of gasoline (containing up to 2% 
benzene) annually, are thus excluded." Beyond this, Justice Stevens did not mention this "par-
ticularly significant" exception. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petro-
leum Institute, 448 U.S. 607. fl28 (1980). 
74. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,947, 5,948 (1978). 
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feasibility of the 1 ppm standard for benzene. Section 6(b)(5) requires 
that standards promulgated under that section be feasible. 75 The 
Secretary's interpretation of economic feasibility required that 
standards not be so costly as to drive entire industries or large 
numbers of employers out of business. Based on a study predicting 
the economic effects of the 1 ppm standard,76 the Secretary deter-
mined that the greater share of the costs of compliance would be 
borne by industries like petroleum refining and petrochemical pro-
duction. 77 Such industries were found to possess the size and stabil-
ity that would allow them to absorb these costs or pass them on to 
consumers. Because the costs of the benzene regulation would not 
endanger the financial welfare of either the industries involved or 
the general economy, the Secretary concluded that the 1 ppm stand-
ard was economically feasible. 78 
The Secretary also considered the benefits which might result 
from the 1 ppm standard, but disavowed any statutory obligation to 
make a systematic evaluation of costs and benefits.79 The Secretary 
read the Act to require that a regulation "assure maximum benefit 
(i.e., prevention of serious illness or death), constrained only by the 
limits of feasibility."80 Accordingly, when the evidence concerning 
the possible health benefits of the benzene regulation was evaluated, 
the Secretary used an approach that would err, if at all, on the side of 
overestimation of those benefits. The Secretary found that ap-
preciable benefits could result from the 1 ppm standard.81 This find-
75. Id. at 5,934. 
76. The study was conducted by Arthur D. Little, Inc. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,934 (1978). 
77. Id. The Secretary estimated the costs of compliance as follows: "first year operating 
costs for all industries combined ... [will] be approximately in the range of $187 million to 
$205 million, recurring annual costs are estimated at approximately $34 million and invest-
ment in engineering controls is expected to be approximately $266 million." Id. 
While Justice Stevens stated that he was not addressing the cost-benefit question, he did use 
the Secretary's estimates to show that for the expenditures required by the 1 ppm standard, 
"only 35,000 employees would gain any benefit." He calculated the costs per employee in the 
rubber manufacturing industry ($1390/employee), the petrochemical industry ($39,6751 
employee), and the petroleum refining industry ($82,000/employee). Industrial Union Depart-
ment, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 629 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
In his dissent, Justice Marshall wrote that these estimates are "misleading" because "most of 
the cost of the benzene standard would be incurred only once and would thus protect an 
unascertained number of employees in the future," over and above those now employed. Id. at 
701-02 n.22 (dissenting opinion). 
78. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,934, 5,941 (1978). 
79. Id. at 5,940. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 5,940-41. The Secretary stated that the number of cancers prevented by· the 
reduction in exposure-the benefits-"may be" or "are likely to be" appreciable. In so finding, 
the Secretary refused to rely on the estimate made by Dr. Richard Wilson, the head of Har-
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ing was based on the generally accepted scientific opinion that the 
risk created by exposure to a carcinogen decreases as the exposure 
level is lowered.82 The Secretary reasoned that if the permissible ex-
posure limit for benzene is reduced from 10 ppm to 1 ppm, the health 
risks benzene creates would be reduced as well. This would mean 
that fewer cases of leukemia would occur at 1 ppm than at 10 ppm, 
and thus that some health benefits would be achieved. 
The Secretary maintained that a quantification (i.e., determining 
the number of lives saved or cancers prevented) of the expected 
benefits was impossible for two reasons. First, the data indicating 
the leukemia risk at higher exposure levels was not complete enough 
to allow a determination of the actual number of deaths expected to 
occur at those levels. 83 Second, even if the risk of leukemia at high 
exposure levels could be identified, the risk at low levels (at 10 ppm 
and 1 ppm) must be extrapolated from that data. Science has yet to 
agree on a single theory of extrapolation. Since a dose-response 
curve84 could not be constructed because of these inadequacies, the 
number of cancers that are likely to occur at either the 10 ppm level 
or the 1 ppm level could not be estimated. Thus, the number of 
cancers prevented by the reduction in exposure-the benefits-could 
not be determined.85 
The Secretary's inability to estimate the cancer risks created by 
low-level exposure to benzene is representative of the essential prob-
lem the Secretary confronts as he regulates occupational car-
cinogens. Because of inadequate scientific data, the Secretary is 
unable to either establish a safe exposure level to a carcinogen, or 
estimate the risks created by low-level exposure to the carcinogen. 
In order to effectively regulate occupational carcinogens despite this 
vard's Energy and Environmental Policy Center. Appearing as an industry witness during the 
hearings on the 1 ppm standard, Dr. Wilson testified that only one leukemia and one other 
cancer would be prevented every six years by the 1 ppm standard. Id. at 5,941. Concerning 
this risk assessment, the Secretary concluded that: "the severe incompleteness of the epi-
demiological data for benzene, combined with the uncertainty inherent in such exercises, pre-
cludes any meaningful use of even an 'upper bound' risk assessment for purposes of setting an 
occupational health standard for benzene." Reply Brief for Federal Parties at 5, Industrial 
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). The 
Secretary also found that Dr. Wilson's hypothesis could not be squared with the rest of the 
record. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,941 (1978). 
82. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,940 (1978). 
83. Id. 
84. A dose-response curve indicates the "relationship between different exposure levels and 
the risk of cancer associated with those exposure levels." McGarity, supra note 46, at 735 
n.27. 
85. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,940-41 (1978). 
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lack of knowledge, the Secretary adopted the generic approach, 
which relieves him from having to estimate the risk present at low 
exposure levels. However, the Supreme Court in Industrial Union 
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute set aside the 
1 ppm standard for benzene because the Secretary failed to make a 
threshold finding that exposure at a 10 ppm level creates a signifi-
cant risk of leukemia. So, while the Court did not directly consider 
the validity of the Secretary's generic approach, its decision may 
prevent the Secretary from using that approach in the future. 
In the next section, the regulatory problems created by occupa-
tional carcinogens will be outlined, and the Secretary's response to 
those problems (i.e., the generic approach) will be described. 
IV. OSHA's GENERIC ApPROACH TO THE REGULATION 
OF OCCUPATIONAL CARCINOGENS 
Cancer's impact on contemporary society is extremely destructive. 
The number of lives lost, the accompanying human anguish, and the 
economic consequences are massive.86 There is presently a recogni-
tion by the scientific community that 60 to 90 percent of all cancer 
may be related to and influenced by environmental factors.87 This 
means that regulation in the workplace may significantly reduce the 
toll exacted by the disease. If cancer-causing agents can be identified 
and occupational exposure eliminated or minimized, cancers may be 
prevented. The problem, however, is that cancer imposes unique 
obstacles to effective regulation by agencies like OSHA.88 
A. Regulatory Problems Created by Cancer 
Two factors conspire to make regulation of carcinogens such a dif-
ficult task: lack of adequate scientific knowledge;89 and the nature of 
cancer itself.90 There is insufficient understanding of the early 
cellular effects of cancer and of the causative factors which lead to 
86. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,150 (1977). See Kraus, Environmental Carcinogenesis: Regula-
tion on the Frontiers of Science, 7 ENV'T LAW 83 (1976-77) [hereinafter cited as Kraus]. For ex-
ample, in 1975, 665,000 new cases of cancer were diagnosed and 365,000 deaths due to cancer 
were reported. Direct annual expenditures because of the disease are well into the tens of 
billions of dollars; indirect costs caused by cancer include the estimated 1.8 million work years 
lost annually to the national economy and to family income because of unemployed and 
underemployed cancer victims. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,150 (1977). 
87. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,150 (1977). 
88. [d. at 54,149-55. 
89. See Kraus, supra note 86, at 94. 
90. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,149 (1977). 
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initiation of the disease in a cell.91 The scientific community is divid-
ed over the question whether the intrusion of a single molecule of a 
carcinogen into a susceptible cell is enough to cause cancer. 92 If the 
so-called "one-hit" theory is correct, no exposure level to a chemical 
carcinogen above 0 ppm would be free of the risk of adverse effects. 
If, however, safe exposure levels do exist, science is not now able to 
determine those levels.93 
There are two biological characteristics which distinguish cancer 
from other processes of chronic toxicity: its general irreversibility of 
effect and the generally long period of latency between exposure to a 
carcinogen and appearance of a tumor.94 Once the transformation 
from a normal to neoplastic (cancerous) cell has occurred, the cell can 
replicate and produce neoplastic daughter cells.· Because of the 
disease's irreversible nature, further exposure to the carcinogen 
after the initial neoplastic change is not necessary to sustain the 
process which can culminate in a tumor that grows autonomously.95 
Consequently, regulation of employee exposure to a carcinogen after 
the cellular transformation to neoplastic status appears to be 
91. [d. at 54,149, 54,151. In particular, science does not yet understand "the induction of a 
critical change in the target cells which detennines their subsequent growth as tumor cells." 
Science has been unable to identify the "specific molecular target of a carcinogen within a 
cell." It is understood, however, that "carcinogens can interact directly with the genetic 
material of the cells (DNA), as well as with other molecules that control cellular functions 
(RNA and proteins)." [d. at 54,151. 
92. [d. at 54,149. Doniger, Federal Regulation oj Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law 
and Policy oj Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 497, 510 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Doniger]; Kraus, supra note 86, at 88-89 n.34. It is also not known whether there are detox-
ification, repair, or other defense mechanisms which are able either to detoxify a carcinogenic 
molecule before it reaches a critical site, to repair damage caused to a DNA molecule, or to 
destroy a mutated DNA molecule before it develops into a cancer. If such defenses exist, there 
may be safe or no-effect exposure levels below which cancer will not be caused. The issue is 
complicated further by the fact that individual susceptibility to carcinogens appears to vary 
greatly. So, to protect all workers absolutely against any risk of leukemia, "even industry 
witnesses agreed that ... only a zero exposure limit [for benzene] would suffice." Industrial 
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 636-37 n.41 
(1980) (plurality opinion). 
93. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,165 (1977). Expert committees "are substantially in agreement 
that dose-response data cannot be used to set no-effect levels for exposure to chemical car-
cinogens." [d. In fact, it has been argued that the "extrapolation of carcinogenic effects at 
high-dose levels to low-dose levels" is a trans-scientific issue. A trans-scientific issue is defined 
as a technical question that is "cast in scientific terms" and yet "for various practical or moral 
reasons cannot be answered by science." McGarity, supra note 46, at 733. 
Mter initiation, the first stage of cancer development, comes "promotion," the development 
of the injured cell to the status of a tumor. Science does not fully understand this stage of the 
disease either. Kraus, supra note 86, at 95. 
94. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,152 (1977). 
95. [d. at 54,151-52. 
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useless. To be effective, the regulation must prevent even a relative-
ly small number of molecules of a carcinogen (which can initiate the 
transformation) from ever interacting with the target cell or cells.96 
The latency period which characterizes cancer's development can 
last anywhere from five to forty years.97 This fact frustrates the 
process of identifying carcinogenic substances by way of observation 
of direct human experiences. The practical difficulties of conducting 
epidemiological studies over years and even generations seem insur-
mountable.98 Also, during the long course of a study, there is a possi-
bility that other factors will intervene which distort the results of the 
study.99 Finally, the decision to wait a number of years for the 
results may be imprudent, since in the interim workers will be con-
stantly exposed to a potential risk of cancer. 100 
As was the case with benzene, the evidence of a substance's carcin-
ogenic effects often comes from epidemiological studies. These retro-
spective studies compare the incidence of cancer in a group of 
workers occupationally exposed to a substance with the incidence of 
that type of cancer in the general population. In addition to the prob-
lem that epidemiological findings only become available many years 
after exposure has occurred,101 there are numerous other difficulties 
inherent in epidemiological studies. 102 Since subjective considera-
tions playa major role in the interpretation of data collected in an 
epidemiological study, scientists will frequently reach different con-
clusions about the substance under consideration.103 Thus, epidemio-
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 54,152. 
98. Kraus, supra note 86, at 95. 
99. Id. 
100. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,152 (1977). 
101. Id. 
102. It is usually the case that workers were exposed to too many different substances at 
unknown doses for unknown periods of time to draw statistically credible conclusions about 
the particular substance being studied. The synergistic (or cumulative) and antagonistic in-
teractions among various chemicals in the workplace reduce further the likelihood that reliable 
conclusions about the effects of a particular chemical can be made. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,149 
(1977); Doniger, supra note 92, at 511. 
103. Since data from these studies is often on the borderline of statistical significance, sub-
jective considerations of the scientist interpreting the data often determine the particular find-
ings made. In addition, the results are entirely dependent on the manner in which the initial 
test and control cohorts were selected; this too is a highly subjective decision. McGarity, supra 
note 46, at 740-41. Because of the great influence exerted by subjective considerations and sci-
entific judgment, the data collected from any epidemiological study may be interpreted differ-
ently by different scientists. Id. at 742. 
Due to all these methodological problems, epidemiological studies produce findings which 
are not necessarily reliable. Animal studies are the major source of data on the carcinogenicity 
of chemicals; unfortunately, they too have their failings. Doniger, supra note 92, at 512-13. It 
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logical studies do not provide the Secretary with conclusive informa-
tion about the health effects of a particular substance. 
Because of the nature of dose-response curves,104 they too are not 
especially helpful to the Secretary as he regulates occupational ex-
posure to carcinogens. The available scientific evidence on which a 
curve is based will often be questionable. Also, any attempt to ex-
trapolate from that data-which indicates the risk accompanying 
high exposure levels-to low levels is greatly dependent on sub-
jective factors. Any dose-response curve is only as accurate as its 
underlying assumptions are valid.105 Because assumptions con-
cerning the manner in which humans respond to carcinogens at low 
exposure levels determine the shape of the curve, risk assessments 
by different scientists (using different assumptions) are often widely 
divergent, even when the same data base is used.106 Since knowledge 
concerning the process by which a chemical carcinogen causes the 
transformation of normal cells into neoplastic ones is so scarce, these 
assumptions can be neither completely discredited nor endorsed. 
Thus, the Secretary is faced with a dilemma. The Act requires that 
workplaces be safe; but when the Secretary regulates an occupa-
tional carcinogen, he does not know whether there is any exposure 
level above 0 ppm that does not create a risk of cancer. And, even if 
there is a safe exposure level, the Secretary has no reliable way of 
determining it. 
This regulatory dilemma has meant that certain scientific issues 
have been relitigated each time a new OSHA standard for a carcino-
gen has been considered. 107 In particular, the question whether there 
is a safe exposure level to the carcinogen under consideration has 
arisen during each new rulemaking. Since no conclusive factual 
answer to this question has been available, OSHA has had to resolve 
this question as a matter of policy.108 The constant reexamination of 
cancer-related issues has severely strained OSHA's resources and 
made its rulemaking a very slow process. As of 1979, OSHA had pro-
mulgated regulations for only nineteen of the great many potentially 
carcinogenic chemicals used in the workplace.109 
should also be noted that benzene exposure has yet to be shown to cause leukemia in animals. 
42 Fed. Reg. 22,516, 22,521 (1977). 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,932 (1978). 
104. See note 84 supra. 
105. McGarity, supra note 46, at 746. 
106. Id. 
107. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,154 (1977). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 54,149. See McGarity, supra note 46, at 746. 
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B. OSHA's Attempt to Reduce These Problems 
OSHA's response to its regulatory dilemma was its generic ap-
proach to regulating occupational exposure to carcinogens. 11o The 
policy is intended to make more efficient use of OSHA's resources 
than has been the case in the past, thus allowing for more active 
regulation. What the approach essentially does is foreclose debate on 
certain cancer-related issues and settle them, as a matter of policy, 
for all future rulemakings.111 The approach leaves open other ques-
tions which will be addressed as each new substance is considered. 112 
For purposes of this article, the relevant issues which OSHA decid-
ed to treat as policy matters concern whether safe exposure levels to 
carcinogens exist and whether they can be found. On the strength of 
considerable scientific support, OSHA determined that carcinogens 
do not have safe or no-effect exposure levels.113 Moreover, OSHA's 
general policy will be that even if such levels do exist, they presently 
cannot be identified by science.114 On the basis of these policy 
judgments and the congressional mandate embodied in section 
6(b)(5) of the Act, the Secretary concluded that he must set the "per-
missible exposure limit ... as low as feasible" for any workplace 
substance found to be carcinogenic.115 Since 0 ppm is assumed to be 
the only safe exposure level, the Secretary must limit exposure to a 
level as close to 0 ppm as industry can afford and achieve. When no 
safe exposure level to benzene could be ascertained from the avail-
able data, the Secretary adopted this approach and determined that 
occupational exposure had to be reduced to 1 ppm. . 
Under the generic approach, the Secretary is relieved from having 
to prove that all exposure levels above 0 ppm create some risk of 
cancer. He is also not required to estimate the risk present at any 
particular exposure level. 116 When the scientific evidence establishes 
110. Identification, Classification and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing a Potential 
Carcinogenic Risk, 29 C.F.R. S 1990.101 (1980). 
111. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,154 (1977). 
112. These questions are: 
(1) whether the Secretary correctly classified the toxic material according to the ap-
propriate criteria; (2) whether the Secretary correctly decided that the classification 
should not be rebutted; (3) the determination of the lowest feasible occupational ex-
posure, or whether there are suitable substitutes found that are less hazardous to 
humans than toxic materials; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of the specific 
protective measures of the proposed standard and (5) the environmental impact aris-
ing from regulation of the toxic material. 
[d. at 54,155. 
113. [d. at 54,166. 
114. [d. at 54,148. 
115. [d. 
116. [d. at 54,167. 
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that a substance is causally linked to cancer, the Secretary is 
authorized to reduce occupational exposure to the lowest feasible 
level without having to quantify the risk created by low-level ex-
posure. 
V. CIRCUIT COURT REVIEW OF SECTION 6(b)(5) STANDARDS 
FOR OCCUPATIONAL CARCINOGENS 
OSHA's generic approach to the regulation of carcinogens incor-
porates scientific concepts that are still in dispute. Among these con-
cepts is OSHA's conclusion that any exposure level to a carcinogen 
above 0 ppm creates some risk of harm. Before the generic approach 
took effect, OSHA had applied this concept in standard-setting pro-
cedures for various carcinogens, including benzene.117 Prior to the 
Fifth Circuit's review of the benzene regulation, three other circuits 
considered OSHA's approach to regulation under section 6(bX5) of 
the Act. 
This section will outline the split between the District of Columbia, 
the Second, and the Third Circuits on one hand, and the Fifth Circuit 
on the other. The section will begin with a brief description of the 
standard of review specified by the Act. Second, the decisions of the 
three circuits will be examined. Finally, the section will discuss the 
Fifth Circuit's consideration of the 1 ppm standard for benzene in 
American Petroleum Institute v. Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration. 118 
A. Section 6(/)'s Substantial Evidence Standard of Review 
Section 6(f) of the Act119 gives each United States circuit court of 
appeals the jurisdiction to review a petition challenging the validity 
of any OSHA regulation promulgated under section 6. Section 6(f) 
also specifies the standard of review circuit courts are to use as they 
review these regulations: 
The determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if sup-
ported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a 
whole. 120 
When the Secretary sets a particular standard under the authority 
granted in section 6, he makes determinations which are based on 
the available scientific and medical evidence. Section 6(f) requires 
117. [d. at 54,149. 
118. 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978). 
119. 29 U.S.C. S 655(0 (1976). 
120. [d. 
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that all of these determinations be supported by substantial evidence 
in the record. If the reviewing court concludes that any of the deter-
minations is not supported by substantial evidence, the court has the 
authority to set aside both the determination and the standard that is 
based on that determination. 121 
An example may be useful to indicate the relationship between sec-
tions 6(b )(5) and 6(t) of the Act. In order to promulgate a permanent 
standard under the authority granted in section 6(b)(5) , the Secre-
tary must find that the substance under consideration is toxic. Sec-
tion 6(b){5) restricts its regulatory mandate to toxic materials and 
harmful physical agents. If a finding of carcinogenicity by the Secre-
tary is challenged, a circuit court will review that determination 
under the substantial evidence test prescribed in section 6(t). If the 
court concludes that the determination is not supported by substan-
tial evidence, the court will set aside the section 6(b)(5) standard 
based on the determination. 
B. The District of Columbia, the Second, and the Third Circuits: 
Their Review of Permanent Standards for Various Carcinogens 
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,122 the 
District of Columbia Circuit considered a petition filed by unions 
whose members were exposed to asbestos dust. The petition re-
quested that the court review the permanent OSHA standards which 
reduced the permissible concentration level for asbestos dust ex-
posure from five fibers to twO.123 The Secretary knew that exposure 
to asbestos dust at high levels and for long periods of time could lead 
to asbestosis and cancers.124 The Secretary also considered OSHA's 
policy judgment that there are no safe exposure levels for carcino-
gens, as well as the generally accepted scientific belief that the risk 
of cancer decreases as the exposure level is lowered. 
The other available evidence was not conclusive. The primary issue 
during the hearings on the asbestos dust standard was whether the 
five fiber standard should be kept or be replaced by a two fiber stand-
ard. There were proponents on each side, and the evidence did not 
prove either side to be clearly correct.125 In addition, the scientific 
121. Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155,1156 (3d 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975). 
122. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
123. The standard for occupational exposure to asbestos dust is codified at 29 C.F.R. 
S 1910.1001 (1980). 
124. 37 Fed. Reg. 11,318 (1972). 
125. 499 F.2d 467, 478-79 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
1981] WORKPLACE CARCINOGENS 645 
data was not reliable enough to permit the Secretary to predict the 
adverse health effects that would occur in workers exposed to either 
the two or the five fiber concentration level. l26 As a result, the deci-
sion to reduce the acceptable concentration level was not based on a 
factual determination. The Secretary knew that asbestos dust ex-
posure presented a cancer risk but did not know the degree to which 
that risk would be reduced by lowering the permissible concentration 
level to two fibers. When he chose between the five fiber standard 
and the two fiber standard, the Secretary made a policy judgment 
which opted for increased protection of worker health. l27 Choosing 
the lower standard, the Secretary concluded that the Act does not 
require him to gamble with human lives when factual certainty is 
lacking. 
As it reviewed the Secretary's decision to reduce the permissible 
concentration level to two fibers, the District of Columbia Circuit 
considered how the substantial evidence test prescribed in section 
6(f) should be applied to an OSHA standard regulating occupational 
exposure to a carcinogen. First, the court accurately sketched the 
nature of the regulatory problem confronting OSHA.l28 The court 
recognized that because cancer-related questions "are on the fron-
tiers of scientific knowledge,"l29 the Secretary lacks the evidence 
needed to make factual determinations. The Secretary must rely 
upon policy judgments as he answers these questions, which means 
that his findings in support of a standard consist of both factual de-
terminations and policy judgments. l3o The Hodgson court responded 
to the dual nature of agency findings by altering its analysis accord-
ing to the type of finding it was considering. For factual determina-
tions, the court applied the traditional substantial evidence standard, . 
examining the record to determine whether it supplied substantial 
support for those determinations. l3l For policy judgments, its test 
was different and focused on whether: 
the agency, given an essentially legislative task to perform, has 
carried it out in a manner calculated to negate the dangers of ar-
bitrariness and irrationality in the formulation of rules for 
general application in the future. 132 
126. [d. at 475. 
127. [d. 
128. [d. at 474-75. See text and notes at notes 88-109 supra. 
129. 499 F.2d 467,474 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
130. [d. at 474-75. 
131. [d. at 474. 
132. [d. at 475 (quoting Automotive Parts and Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330,338 
(D.C. Cir. 1968)). 
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The Hodgson court approved the Secretary's policy judgment 
selecting the two fiber standard. Instead of searching the record to 
determine whether substantial evidence supported the Secretary's 
choice of the two fiber standard, the court evaluated the Secretary's 
choice in light of the congressional purpose embodied in the Act. The 
court found that the Secretary's decision was consistent with the 
Act's "overriding concern," which is the "protection of the health of 
employees."133 The court suggested that if the Secretary errs in the 
selection of a permissible exposure level, the error must work in 
favor of enhanced protection of worker health. 
Through its treatment of the Secretary's choice of the two fiber 
standard, the District of Columbia Circuit indicated that the Secre-
tary is not required under the Act to quantify the health benefits ex-
pected to result from a lower standard. In order to determine the 
benefits that may be achieved by the two fiber standard, it would be 
necessary to estimate the number of workers who would develop 
cancer at a five fiber concentration level and at a two fiber concen-
tration level. The difference-the number of cancers prevented by 
the reduction in exposure-equals the benefits. The Hodgson court 
noted that the cancer risks created by asbestos dust exposure at 
these levels could not be estimated,134 and still upheld the 
Secretary's decision to lower the permissible concentration level. 
Hence, the District of Columbia Circuit did not demand an estimate 
of the risks or the expected benefits. The court determined that as 
long as the Secretary could reasonably conclude that the two fiber 
standard will enhance protection of worker health, he was author-
ized to make a policy judgment selecting that level. 
Also, the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted the language in 
section 6(b)(5) which requires that a permanent standard be "feasi-
ble."135 The petitioning unions argued that when the Secretary 
decided to postpone the effective date of the two fiber standard for 
four years, he improperly considered economic factors.136 The court 
rejected this argument, stating that Congress did not intend for the 
Secretary to ignore economic considerations. The court concluded 
that a standard is infeasible if it would cause a general collapse of in-
dustrial employers. 137 On the other hand, the court determined that 
133. 499 F.2d 467,475 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
134. [d. 
135. 29 U.S.C. § 655(bX5) (1976). 
136. 499 F.2d 467, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
137. [d. at 478. The court wrote: 
Congress does not appear to have intended to protect employees by putting their 
employers out of business-either by requiring protective devices unavailable under 
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a standard may be economically feasible under section 6(b X5) even 
though it causes substantial increases in an industry's production 
costs and forces an employer out of business.138 
By identifying protection of worker health as the overriding con-
cern of the Act, the District of Columbia Circuit indicated that scien-
tific uncertainty should not ordinarily require postponement of an 
OSHA regulation that the Secretary has determined to be necessary 
to protect workers. A postponement for the sake of gathering more 
evidence would frustrate the Act's purpose, because workers would 
continue to be exposed to health risks that could prove to be great. 
When the Secretary is uncertain about the extent of the expected 
benefits, but believes that some will result, the District of Columbia 
Circuit advocated prompt regulation. 
The Second Circuit has also applied the substantial evidence stand-
ard of section 6(f) to an OSHA regulation passed pursuant to section 
6(bX5). In Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA,139 a petition 
was filed with the circuit court challenging the validity of a perma-
nent OSHA standard which set the permissible exposure limit for 
vinyl chloride at 1 ppm. Having concluded that vinyl chloride was 
carcinogenic, the Secretary had selected a 1 ppm as the lowest ex-
posure level that was economically and technologically feasible. 140 
The petitioners were industrial manufacturers of vinyl chloride and 
vinyl chloride products. They raised five challenges to the standard, 
among which was the contention that the available evidence did not 
establish that a 1 ppm exposure limit was required by health and 
safety considerations. 141 Rejecting these challenges, the Second Cir-
cuit upheld the standard.142 
When the petitioners contended that the 1 ppm standard was not 
justified by the available evidence, they raised arguments which 
were similar to those advanced by industry challengers of the ben-
zene regulation.143 The petitioners in Society of Plastics Industry, 
existing technology or by making financial viability generally impossible. 
138. [d. The court wrote: 
It would appear to be consistent with the purposes of the Act to envisage the 
economic demise of an employer who has lagged behind the rest of industry in 
protecting the health and safety of employees and is consequently financially unable 
to comply with new standards as quickly as other employers. 
139. 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). 
140. The standard for occupational exposure to vinyl chloride is codified at 29 C.F.R. 
S 1910.1017 (1980). 
141. 509 F.2d 1301, 1303 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). 
142. [d. at 1311. 
143. In the benzene case, industry petitioners cited studies which indicated no excess in-
cidence of leukemia at exposure levels below 100 ppm, and argued that a safe exposure level 
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Inc. v. OSHA argued that the 1 ppm standard was unnecessary 
because it was impossible to determine whether low-level exposure 
to vinyl chloride was safe or unsafe. They cited scientific studies 
which found no adverse health effects in workers exposed to vinyl 
chloride at levels below 200 ppm. Since exposure at levels well above 
1 ppm had not been shown to be unsafe, the petitioners concluded 
that there was no need to reduce exposure to 1 ppm. 144 
In reviewing this challenge to the vinyl chloride standard, the Sec-
ond Circuit adopted the Hodgson construction of section 6(£)'s sub-
stantial evidence test.145 The court noted that if the overall policy 
goals of the Act are to be achieved, the Secretary must act even 
though some of his findings lack conclusive factual support.146 The 
Second Circuit determined that when the "factual finger points . 
[but] does not include," the "command" of the Act is clear.147 
[I]t remains the duty of the Secretary to act to protect the work-
ingman, and to act even in circumstances where existing meth-
odology or research is deficient.148 
Like the District of Columbia Circuit, the Second Circuit concluded 
that the Act reflects a basic policy preference in favor of regulatory 
action reasonably designed to protect the health of workers. 
The Second Circuit found that the Secretary's choice of the 1 ppm 
standard for vinyl chloride was supported by "quite sufficient" 
evidence. 149 The Secretary determined that the record did not 
establish any exposure level as safe. The Secretary made a policy 
judgment that any exposure to vinyl chloride above 0 ppm was un-
safe, and set the permissible exposure limit as close to 0 ppm as was 
feasible. The Second Circuit upheld the Secretary's reasoning, and 
emphasized what was at stake in the dispute over the validity of the 1 
ppm standard: "it must be remembered that we are dealing here 
with human lives."15o 
The Second Circuit did not require an estimate of the expected 
benefits of the 1 ppm standard for vinyl chloride. Not knowing what 
existed well above 10 ppm. See note 45 supra. 
144. 509 F.2d 1301, 1303, 1308 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). 
145. [d. at 1304. 
146. [d. at 1303-04. 
147. [d. at 1308. 
148. [d. 
149. [d. The court also cited the results of an animal exposure study sponsored by the in-
dustry's own trade association. The study indicated that fatal liver angiosarcoma and other 
kidney and liver diseases occurred in animals at the 50 ppm level. [d. 
150. [d. 
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health risks, if any, were created by low-level exposure,151 the 
Secretary was only able to deduce that the reduction to 1 ppm would 
improve protection of worker health. As the Second Circuit applied 
section 6(f)'s substantial evidence test, this deduction was sufficient 
to support the Secretary's finding that the 1 ppm standard would 
achieve some health benefits. 
The petitioners in Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA also 
contended that the 1 ppm standard was not technologically feasible 
as required by section 6(b)(5).152 Rejecting this contention, the Sec-
ond Circuit portrayed the Act as a technology-forcing statute. The 
court determined that a feasible standard under section 6(b )(5) may 
force employers to either improve technologies already in use or 
develop completely new technologies. 153 
In Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. 
Brennan, 154 the Third Circuit used section 6(f)'s substantial evidence 
standard to review a policy judgment made by the Secretary. The 
court reviewed permanent OSHA standards regulating, among 
other things,155 employee exposure to mixtures containing one per-
cent or more of ethyleneimine (EI). Industry petitioners argued that 
no substantial evidence existed in the record to support the Secre-
tary's finding that EI was a human carcinogen.156 
Before adopting the EI standard, the Secretary concluded that EI 
was carcinogenic in animals. However, there was no evidence in-
dicating that EI was carcinogenic in humans as well. The Secretary 
had two regulatory alternatives: until conclusive evidence became 
available, he could treat EI as either carcinogenic or non-carcino-
genic in humans. 157 If the Secretary adopted the latter approach, he 
would be unable to regulate the substance under section 6(bX5). 
Adoption of the former approach would allow the Secretary to 
regulate EI as if it were a human carcinogen. The Secretary decided 
to treat EI as a human carcinogen, believing that to be the "responsi-
ble and correct" decision. 158 The Third Circuit approved the Secre-
tary's decision, finding that he had "properly weighed the only 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 1308-09. 
153. Id. at 1309. 
154. 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975). 
155. These standards were applicable to 14 selected carcinogens, and are codified at 29 
C.F.R. §§ 1910.1003-1910.1016 (1980). 
156. 503 F.2d 1155, 1157 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975). 
157. 39 Fed. Reg. 3,756, 3,758 (1974). 
158. Id. 
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available alternatives."159 Accordingly, the court rejected the peti-
tioners' challenge.16o 
In reviewing the Secretary's decision to treat EI as a human 
carcinogen, the Third Circuit adopted the Hodgson construction of 
section 6(f).161 The Secretary made a policy judgment, or "legislative 
policy decision," that if a substance was shown in two studies to be 
carcinogenic in animals, it must be treated as carcinogenic in man.162 
The Third Circuit examined the Secretary's judgment to determine 
whether it was consistent with the Act's language and purpose.163 
The court upheld the judgment, agreeing with the Secretary that 
section 6(bX5) compelled him to treat EI as a human carcinogen.164 
Like the District of Columbia Circuit and the Second Circuit, the 
Third Circuit found that the Act requires the Secretary to resolve 
scientific uncertainty in favor of increased protection of workers. 
In American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA,165 the Third Circuit 
Court again considered an OSHA regulation promulgated under sec-
tion 6(b X5). Coke manufacturers and their trade associations peti-
tioned the court to review the Secretary's permanent standard for 
coke oven emissions, which reduced the permissible exposure limit to 
the lowest feasible level. 166 The petitioners challenged the limit, 
arguing that it was invalid because there was no substantial evidence 
in the record to justify it.167 The Third Circuit rejected this challenge 
and upheld the Secretary's decision.168 
The court required a quantification of neither the expected 
benefits of the standard nor the risk presented by low-level exposure 
to coke oven emissions. While the Secretary provided a more de-
tailed examination of the possible benefits than he had for the 
asbestos dust and vinyl chloride standards, he found that it was not 
appropriate "to quantify even a range of the benefits" of the lower 
standard for coke oven emissions. 169 Recognizing that an estimate of 
the expected benefits was unavailable, the Third Circuit allowed the 
159. 503 F.2d 1155. 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1974). cert. denied. 420 U.S. 973 (1975). 
160. Id. at 1161. 
161. Id. at 1158. 1159-60. See text at notes 128-32 supra. 
162. 503 F.2d 1155. 1158 (3d Cir. 1974). cert. denied. 420 U.S. 973 (1975). 
163. Id. at 1158. 1159. 
164. Id. at 1159. 1160-61. 
165. 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978). cert. dismissed. 49 U.S.L.W. 3145 (1980). 
166. The standards for occupational exposure to coke oven emissions are codified at 29 
C.F.R. S 1910.1029 (1980). 
167. 577 F.2d 825. 827 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3145 (1980). 
168. Id. at 833, 840. 
169. 41 Fed. Reg. 46,742, 46,750 (1976). 
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Secretary to reduce the permissible exposure limit on the basis of the 
conclusion that the reduction would achieve some health benefits. 
The Third Circuit considered only section 6(b)(5) of the Act when it 
reviewed the Secretary's standard for coke oven emissions. As inter-
preted by the court, section 6(b)(5) required the Secretary to reduce 
the permissible exposure limit to the "lowest possible" level after he 
found that no safe exposure level existed above 0 ppmYo The court 
determined that the only constraint on the Secretary's standard-
setting authority was section 6(bX5),s "requirement of feasibility, 
both technological and economic."171 The Third Circuit concluded 
that because the coke oven emissions standard met the feasibility 
requirement, the Secretary had acted within his statutory authority 
when he promulgated the standard. 172 
The decisions of the District of Columbia, the Second, and the 
Third Circuits reveal a similarity in approach to the review of section 
6(bX5) standards for occupational carcinogens. The Second and 
Third Circuits adopted the District of Columbia Circuit's construc-
tion of the substantial evidence standard specified in section 6(f).173 
These three circuits also treated the Secretary's finding that a stand-
ard would achieve some health benefits in the same way. In each 
case, the Secretary was unable to estimate the cancer risks created 
by low-level exposure. Thus, he could not estimate the number of 
cancers that would be prevented by a reduction in exposure. But he 
did conclude that the reduction would better protect the health of 
workers exposed to the carcinogen. The three circuits allowed the 
Secretary to regulate on the basis of this conclusion, and suggested 
that scientific uncertainty must be resolved in favor of enhanced pro-
tection of the affected workers. Since the Act is primarily concerned 
with the protection of workers,174 and commands the Secretary to 
act toward that end even when the record is incomplete and incon-
clusive,175 these circuits did not make quantification of the risks or 
the expected benefits a prerequisite to regulation under section 
6(bX5). 
Another similarity among the decisions of these circuits was the 
170. 577 F.2d 825, 832 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3145 (1980). 
171. [d. 
172. [d. at 833. 
173. See text at notes 128-32 supra. 
174. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO V. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
175. Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. V. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). 
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absence of any mention of section 3(8) of the Act. That section 
defines an occupational safety and health standard as a standard 
that is "reasonably necessary or appropriate" to provide safe or 
healthful workplaces.176 Reviewing section 6(b)(5) standards, these 
circuits only focused on whether that section's requirements were 
met (e.g., feasibility). The courts did not conclude that section 3(8) 
alters the Secretary's regulatory duty as outlined in section 6(bX5). 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit's review of the benzene regulation repre-
sented a distinct change. 
C. The Fifth Circuit's Review of the Benzene Regulation 
in AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE V. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 
1. The Reasoning of the Fifth Circuit 
The Secretary promulgated the permanent benzene standard of 1 
ppm on February 3, 1978, and published the standard on February 
10, 1978. He selected March 13, 1978, as the effective date of the 
standard. On February 2 and 3, the American Petroleum Institute 
(API) filed petitions for review of the standard in the Fifth Circuit. 
Other producers and users of benzene and benzene-containing prod-
ucts either intervened on API's behalf or filed original petitions for 
review in other circuits. These petitions were transferred to the 
Fifth Circuit and consolidated with the API case. The Industrial 
Union Department, AFL-CIO, intervened on OSHA's behalf in favor 
of the 1 ppm exposure limit for benzene.177 
The petitioners raised a number of challenges to the benzene regu-
lation, the most important of which focused on the Secretary's 
reduction of the permissible exposure limit from 10 ppm to 1 ppm. 
The petitioners contended that there was no substantial evidence in 
the record to show that the reduction was reasonably necessary or 
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of 
employment.178 Invoking section 3(8) of the Act,179 the petitioners 
argued that the section should be construed as the Fifth Circuit had 
earlier construed ostensibly similar provisions of the Consumer 
Product Safety Act (CPSA) in Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission. 180 The petitioners asserted that 
176. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976). 
177. American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493,499 (5th Cir. 1978). 
178. Id. at 500. 
179. 29 U.S.C. S 652(8) (1976). 
180. ~69 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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section 3(8), read according to Aqua Slide, imposes two re-
quirements upon the Secretary as he sets a standard under the Act. 
The Secretary must attempt to assess the expected benefits of the 
standard, and then determine whether those benefits justify the 
costs to industry of compliance with the standard. The petitioners 
concluded that when the Secretary selected 1 ppm as the permissible 
exposure limit for benzene, he failed to meet either of the require-
ments that section 3(8) makes prerequisites to regulation. Conse-
quently, the petitioners requested that the 1 ppm standard be set 
aside. 181 
In reviewing this challenge, the Fifth Circuit accepted the inter-
pretation of section 6(f) established by the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson. The 
Fifth Circuit recognized that policy judgments, unlike factual deter-
minations, can neither be verified nor refuted by the record. The 
court noted that while policy judgments must be subjected to judicial 
scrutiny, they will survive this scrutiny if they are compatible with 
the Act's language and purpose. 182 
Turning to the relevant statutory language, the Fifth Circuit ex-
amined the scope of regulatory authority granted to the Secretary 
under section 6(b X5). The court emphasized the statutory constraints 
which limit the Secretary's authority under section 6(bX5), and 
determined that the section does not give the Secretary the authori-
ty to adopt, without any consideration of the costs involved, stand-
ards designed to make workplaces absolutely free of risk. 183 Section 
6(bX5) standards must be feasible, and as they are formulated, the 
Secretary must consider certain kinds of information.184 The Fifth 
Circuit suggested that because Congress statutorily required consid-
eration of this information, it intended that the Secretary regulate 
according to what he knows, rather than according to what he is un-
sure Of.185 Most important, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the peti-
tioners that section 3(8) limits the Secretary's authority to pro-
mulgate regulations for toxic materials under section 6(b X5).186 
181. 581 F.2d 493, 501 (5th Cir. 1978). 
182. Id. at 497. 
183. Id. at 502. 
184. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). Section 6(b)(5) requires that the Secretary use the "best 
available evidence." Standards are to be developed by relying on "research, demonstrations, 
experiments, and such other information as may be appropriate." The Secretary is to consider 
"experience gained under this and other health and safety laws" as well. 
185. 581 F.2d 493, 504 (5th Cir. 1978). 
186. Id. at 502. 
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To specify the requirements imposed by section 3(8), the Fifth Cir-
cuit turned to the decision invoked by the petitioners, Aqua Slide 'N' 
Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission. In that case, 
the Fifth Circuit considered a petition challenging the validity of a 
standard for swimming pool slides promulgated by the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (Commission). The Consumer Product 
Safety Act (CPSA),187 like the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
specifies a substantial evidence test for judicial review of findings 
made by the Commission.188 The Aqua Slide petitioners contended 
that there was no substantial evidence in the record to support the 
Commission's finding that its standard was "reasonably necessary 
to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury."189 
Two provisions of the CPSA were relevant to the Fifth Circuit's 
disposition of this petition. First, the court considered section 7(a) , 
which provides that the requirements imposed by a Commission 
standard must be "reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce an 
unreasonable risk of injury associated with [a consumer] product."19o 
The second provision, section 9(c), requires that the Commission 
make certain findings before it promulgates any regulation. Among 
the required findings is one which determines that the regulation is 
"reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk of 
injury."191 The Fifth Circuit set aside the challenged aspects of the 
Commission's standard for swimming pool slides, finding that the 
Commission failed to meet the duty imposed upon it by sections 7(a) 
and 9(C).192 
In American Petroleum Institute v. Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the duty 
which exists in the CPSA is also present in the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act. To reach this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that the requirements imposed by sections 7(a) and 9(c) of the 
CPSA are precisely similar to those imposed by section 3(8) of the 
Act. 193 In addition, the court found that the CPSA and the Act have 
parallel purposes. The Fifth Circuit noted that Congress intended 
the CPSA "to protect consumers from dangerous products," and in-
tended the Act "to protect workers from dangerous conditions of 
employment."194 Because of these statutory similarities, the Fifth 
187. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051·2081 (1976). 
188. [d. S 2060(c). 
189. 569 F.2d 831, 834·35 (5th Cir. 1978). 
190. 15 U.S.C. § 2056(aX1). 
191. 15 U.S.C. S 2058(cX2XA). 
192. 569 F.2d 831, 835, 844 (5th Cir. 1978). 
193. 581 F.2d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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Circuit used Aqua Slide as a guide when it examined whether OSHA 
had adequately shown that the 1 ppm standard for benzene was 
reasonably necessary to provide safe workplaces.195 
The Fifth Circuit described the duty which the CPSA imposes 
upon the Commission, and which section 3(8) likewise imposes upon 
the Secretary. Before either agency regulates, it must establish that 
a hazard is present and that the regulation will reduce the risk of 
harm. 196 The more important requirement, however, is that the 
agency must weigh the benefits expected to result from the regula-
tion against the costs of compliance that the regulation will impose 
upon industry. The Fifth Circuit noted that while an elaborate cost-
benefit analysis is not necessary, the agency must establish that the 
expected benefits bear a reasonable relationship to the costS.197 The 
court indicated that the agency will not be able to determine whether 
this reasonable relationship exists unless it first estimates the ex-
pected benefits and costs of the regulation. 198 
The Fifth Circuit applied these section 3(8) requirements to the 
record supporting the benzene regulation, and concluded that they 
were not satisfied by the Secretary's findings. 199 The Secretary did 
estimate the expected compliance costs of the 1 ppm standard, and 
found it to be economically feasible. The Fifth Circuit did not set 
aside this finding. However, the Secretary's finding that the benefits 
from the 1 ppm exposure limit may be, or are likely to be, ap-
preciable, did not survive the court's review. The Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that this finding was not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record.20o As one prerequisite to regulation under section 6(bX5), 
the court required that the Secretary provide a "rough but edu-
cated" estimate of the benefits expected to be achieved by the reduc-
tion to 1 ppm.201 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit set aside both the 
Secretary's finding of appreciable benefits and the 1 ppm standard 
for benzene. 
2. Differences Between the Fifth Circuit and the Other 
Three Circuits 
Because of its application of section 3(8) to section 6(bX5) and its 
interpretation of section 3(8), the Fifth Circuit imposed a require-
194. [d. 
195. [d. 
196. [d. at 502-03. 
197. [d. at 503. 
198. [d. 
199. [d. at 503-04, 505. 
200. [d. at 503. 
201. [d. at 504. 
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ment upon the Secretary which the District of Columbia, the Second, 
and the Third Circuits did not. That is, the Secretary must establish 
that the expected benefits bear a reasonable relationship to the costs 
before he can validly promulgate a regulation. By making this find-
ing a prerequisite to regulation, the Fifth Circuit also required that 
the Secretary estimate the extent of the expected benefits. This, too, 
was inconsistent with the approach used by the other circuits. These 
differences will be considered in reverse order. 
a. The Fifth Circuit Required an Estimate of the Expected 
Benefits of a Regulation 
The Fifth Circuit did not hold that the Secretary's finding of ap-
preciable benefits was unsupported. The court upheld the Secre-
tary's finding that exposure to benzene at a 10 ppm level creates 
some risk of leukemia.202 The Fifth Circuit determined that the Sec-
retary was justified in finding that all exposure levels above 0 ppm 
pose some risk because that opinion is shared by some, although not 
all, scientific experts. Moreover, the court concluded that since there 
is scientific agreement that the risk of cancer decreases as the expo-
sure level is lowered, the Secretary had an adequate basis on which 
to deduce that the reduction in benzene exposure from 10 ppm to 1 
ppm would provide greater protection of workers.203 However, the 
court noted that this deduction, while rational, did not necessarily 
mean that the 1 ppm standard would yield measurable benefits in 
terms of lives saved or cancers prevented. The Secretary's deduction 
that some benefits would result from the 1 ppm standard did not pro-
vide the "rough but educated" estimate the Fifth Circuit 
demanded.204 
If the District of Columbia Circuit, the Second Circuit, or the Third 
Circuit had reviewed the 1 ppm standard, each probably would have 
upheld the Secretary's reasoning. Those courts were satisfied with 
the Secretary's deduction that the regulation under consideration 
would enhance protection of worker health, thus achieving some 
health benefits. Like the Fifth Circuit, the Second and the Third Cir-
cuits upheld the Secretary's findings that any exposure above 0 ppm 
created some risk, and that a reduction in exposure would better pro-
tect the health of workers. 206 On the basis of these findings alone, the 
202. [d. at 503. 
203. [d. 
204. [d. at 503, 504. 
205. See text at notes 149·51, 170·72 supra. 
1981] WORKPLACE CARCINOGENS 657 
circuits permitted the Secretary to reduce the permissible exposure 
limit to a feasible level as near as possible to 0 ppm. They did not con-
clude that an estimate of the expected benefits is a prerequisite to 
regulation. 
The split over whether the Secretary is required to estimate the ex-
pected benefits reflects a more fundamental division between the 
Fifth Circuit, and the District of Columbia, the Second, and the 
Third Circuits. The latter three found in the Act a strong policy 
preference in favor of regulation that is reasonably designed to pro-
tect workers, even when that regulation is based on inconclusive sci-
entific evidence. The Fifth Circuit severely weakened that policy 
preference by demanding considerably more factual support for the 
Secretary's regulation. The Fifth Circuit did not allow the Secretary 
to resolve the scientific uncertainty about the expected benefits in 
favor of increased protection of the affected workers. So, to a 
greater degree than its predecessors, the Fifth Circuit stressed the 
policy in the Act which requires that OSHA standards be grounded 
as much as possible on factual findings. 206 
Although the Fifth Circuit required greater factual support for the 
Secretary's finding of appreciable benefits, the court argued that 
OSHA would not have to wait for the deaths of workers exposed to 
less than 10 ppm before it could validly reduce the permissible ex-
posure limit.207 The Fifth Circuit indicated that the needed factual 
support may be provided by either of two methods. First, future 
studies might supply adequate information to allow the charting of a 
dose-response curve that could be extrapolated to low exposure 
levels.208 Second, animal studies might permit the Secretary to iden-
tify the probable health risks to humans presented by low-level 
benzene exposure.209 
With the data OSHA now has, it cannot estimate the leukemia 
risks created by exposure to benzene at specific levels. In order to 
identify these risks, OSHA would have to undertake prospective epi-
demiological studies in which workers would be exposed to benzene 
at various levels.210 Only with this approach will OSHA accumulate 
206. 581 F.2d 493, 504 (5th Cir. 1978). The court wrote: "By requiring the consideration of 
such kinds of information, Congress provided that OSHA regulate on the basis of knowledge 
rather than on the unknown." See text and notes at notes 184-85 supra. 
207. 581 F.2d 493, 504 (5th Cir. 1978). 
208. [d. 
209. [d. 
210. McGarity, supra note 46, at 805 n.417. Animal studies would seem to be of little use in 
providing an estimate of the expected benefits, because such studies have not yet shown that 
658 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:623 
the data (i.e., leukemia risks associated with particular exposure 
levels) that is needed to construct a dose-responsive curve. Unfor-
tunately, this approach makes the accumulation of data dependent 
upon the exposed workers developing leukemia. Since science has 
yet to agree upon a single theory of extrapolation from high ex-
posure levels to low ones, it may also be necessary to do epidemio-
logical studies of the leukemia risk at low levels (i.e., 10 ppm and 1 
ppm). By requiring an estimate of the expected benefits, the Fifth 
Circuit may well have required that OSHA postpone regulation until 
workers develop leukemia because of low-level exposure to benzene. 
b. The Fifth Circuit Required that the Expected Benefits of a 
Regulation bear a Reasonable Relationship to its Costs 
According to the Fifth Circuit, the Secretary must provide sub-
stantial evidence showing that the expected benefits of a regulation 
bear a reasonable relationship to its costs. The Fifth Circuit found 
the requirement in section 3(8), which it interpreted in accord with 
its earlier construction of the CPSA in Aqua Slide.211 The court's use 
of Aqua Slide as a guide was not appropriate. 
The language which the Occupational Safety and Health Act and 
the CPSA share in common requires that agency standards be "rea-
sonably necessary" to achieve certain policy goals. The American 
Petroleum Institute court interpreted the Aqua Slide decision as 
holding that the CPSA's "reasonably necessary" language requires 
the Commission to establish that a reasonable relationship exists be-
tween a regulation's costs and benefits. At one point in its opinion, 
the Aqua Slide court did suggest that the CPSA's "reasonably nec-
essary" language compels the Commission to make a close examina-
tion of the effect that a regulation would have on a consumer prod-
uct's utility and market cost.212 However, the proper interpretation 
of Aqua Slide seems to be that the cost-benefit requirement is im-
posed because of the language in the CPSA which directs the Com-
mission to protect the public from "an unreasonable risk of injury 
associated with [a consumer] product."213 
benzene exposure is causally linked to the development of leukemia in animals. 42 Fed. Reg. 
22,516, 22,521 (1977); 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918, 5,932 (1978). 
211. See text at notes 187-98 supra. 
212. 569 F.2d 831, 844 (5th Cir. 1978). The court stated: 
In evaluating the "reasonable necessity" for a standard, the Commission has a duty 
to take a hard look, not only at the nature and severity of the risk, but also at the 
potential the standard has for reducing the severity or frequency of the injury, and 
the effect the standard would have on the utility, cost or availability of the product. 
213. 15 U.S.C. S 2056(a)(1) (1976) (emphasis supplied). 
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The Fifth Circuit in Aqua Slide found no definition of "reasonably 
necessary" in the CPSA. From that absence, the court inferred that 
Congress intended that the Commission and the courts define the 
language on a case-by-case basis. 214 The Fifth Circuit also deter-
mined that the "reasonably necessary" requirement is tied in with 
the statutory language in the CPSA which requires the Commission 
to protect the public from "an unreasonable risk of injury."215 The 
court noted that the only way to assess whether a Commission stand-
ard is "reasonably necessary" is in light of the risk created by the 
particular product under consideration.216 Since the reasonable 
necessity of a standard depends upon the reasonableness of the risk 
being addressed, and since the risk will be different from product to 
product, the CPSA allows the Commission to define "reasonably 
necessary" according to the circumstances of each case. 
The Aqua Slide court found a firm definition of "unreasonable 
risk" in the CPSA's legislative history.217 The court recognized that 
under the CPSA, the Commission must assess the reasonableness of 
a risk by weighing certain factors. On one side, the Commission must 
evaluate both the severity of the injury that may be caused by use of 
the product, and the likelihood that the product will cause such an in-
jury. On the other, the Commission is to consider the costs that will 
be imposed upon consumers218 and manufacturers by the proposed 
regulation. A risk is unreasonable if the former (the severity and 
likelihood of injury due to use of the product) outweighs the latter 
(the costs to consumers and manufacturers caused by the 
regulation).219 If the risk is unreasonable, the Commission may pro-
mulgate a regulation that is "reasonably necessary" to reduce or 
eliminate that risk. If, however, the risk is reasonable, the Commis-
214. 569 F.2d 831, 839 (5th Cir. 1978). 
215. [d. 
216. [d. The court wrote that "the necessity for the standard depends upon the nature of 
the risk. ... " 
217. [d. 
218. [d. The court noted that the "legislative history specifies the costs to consumers that 
are to be considered: increases in price, decreased availability of a product, and also reductions 
in product usefulness," H.R. REP. No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1972). 
219. 569 F.2d 831, 839 (5th Cir. 1978). The court wrote that the "reasonableness of the risk 
is a function of the burden a standard would impose on a user of the product." The Fifth Cir-
cuit also quoted Forester v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, in which the District of 
Columbia Circuit wrote: 
The requirement that the risk be "unreasonable" necessarily involves a balancing 
test like that familiar in tort law: The regulation may issue if the severity of the injury 
that may result from the product, factored by the likelihood of the injury, offsets the 
harm the regulation itself imposes upon manufacturers and consumers. 
559 F.2d 774, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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sion has no authority under the CPSA to regulate it.220 
By formulating this definition of "unreasonable risk," the Aqua 
Slide court indicated that the CPSA's "unreasonable risk" language, 
not its "reasonably necessary" language, forces the Commission to 
weigh the expected benefits and costs of a regulation. Thus, the 
American Petroleum Institute court's use of Aqua Slide as a guide to 
construing section 3(8)'s "reasonably necessary or appropriate" 
language was mistaken. That is the view expressed by the District of 
Columbia Circuit in American Federation of Labor, etc. v. 
Marshall,221 a case decided after American Petroleum Institute v. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 
In American Federation of Labor, the District of Columbia Circuit 
reviewed an industry petition challenging the validity of a perma-
nent OSHA standard regulating exposure to cotton dust. The court 
found substantial evidence in the record to support the Secretary's 
finding that the cotton dust standard was economically feasible. 222 
However, the petitioners argued that there is a statutory constraint 
upon the Secretary's standard-setting authority in addition to the 
feasibility requirement of section 6(b)(5). The petitioners contended 
that the Secretary has no authority under section 6(b)(5) to pro-
mulgate a standard without making a formal cost-benefit analysis.223 
The petitioners suggested that this requirement is imposed upon the 
Secretary either by section 6(b)(5)'s feasibility requirement or by sec-
tion 3(8)'s "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language. In sup-
port of their interpretation of section 3(8), the petitioners cited 
American Petroleum Institute v. Occupational Safety and Health 
A dministration. 224 
The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the petitioners' conten-
tion, and agreed with OSHA that section 6(b)(5) regulations are con-
strained "only by the limits of feasibility."225 The court adopted the 
220. The court noted that the Senate report cited the example of a sharp knife in order to in-
dicate how Congress wanted the Commission to assess the reasonableness of a risk. S. REP. 
No. 749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1972). The knife is capable of causing injury, but that risk is 
reasonable because it can only be eliminated by dulling the blade, which would also make the 
knife useless to consumers. The costs to consumers (i.e., elimination of utility value) outweigh 
the benefits (i.e., reduced risk of injury). However, that same knife in a child's silverware set 
might pose an unreasonable risk, because the knife's sharp edge has no utility value for 
children. Dulling the blade would not cost the consumers (i.e., children) more than it would 
benefit them. 569 F.2d 831, 839 (5th Cir. 1978). 
221. 617 F .2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
222. Id. at 662. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 665 n.169. 
225. Id. at 663. 
~ - ---------
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Hodgson construction of section 6(bX5)'s feasibility requirement, 
which places no duty upon the Secretary to make a cost-benefit 
analysis.226 In addition, the court did not accept the petitioners' 
interpretation of section 3(8), finding their reliance on American 
Petroleum Institute v. Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion to be "especially unpersuasive."227 The court determined that 
the American Petroleum Institute decision was inappropriately 
based on the Aqua Slide decision, which construed "an entirely dif-
ferent statutory scheme." The District of Columbia Circuit noted 
that the CPSA's "unreasonable risk" language requires a balancing 
of costs and benefits. The court concluded that because section 3(8) 
of the Act contains no "unreasonable risk" language, it does not 
compel the Secretary to weigh costs and benefits prior to 
regulation. 228 
As further support for its use of Aqua Slide as a guide to constru-
ing section 3(8) of the Act, the Fifth Circuit noted that the CPSA and 
the Act have parallel purposes. The court reasoned that because 
these Acts require the protection of their intended beneficiaries (i.e., 
consumers under the CPSA, and workers under the Act), Congress 
intended that these Acts impose the same requirement (i.e., weigh 
costs and benefits) upon the agencies which implement them.229 
While these Acts do have protective purposes, the Fifth Circuit over-
looked the fact that the Commission and OSHA face different con-
siderations as they promulgate regulations designed to achieve that 
protection. 
When the Commission regulates, it is often faced with the fact that 
a certain attribute of a consumer product presents both a risk of in-
jury to its user and provides that user with a benefit (e.g., sharp edge 
of a knife).230 The risk created by the knife's edge must be consid-
ered reasonable because a regulation which eliminated the risk 
would cost consumers more than it would benefit them.231 Thus, the 
Commission is obliged to avoid regulation and allow consumers to 
decide whether the benefits gained by using the knife are worth the 
risk of injury created. 
Different factors influence OSHA's regulation. First, unlike con-
sumers, workers are ordinarily unable to either estimate or avoid the 
226. [d. at 665 n.168. 
227. [d. at 665 n.169. 
228. [d. at 663, 665 n.169. 
229. 581 F.2d 493,502 (5th Cir. 1978). 
230. Brief for Federal Parties at 47 n.38, Industrial Union Department V. American 
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
231. See note 220 supra. 
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health risks created by conditions in the workplace.232 Second, when 
a workplace substance creates a risk of harm to workers, it usually 
does not also provide those workers with a benefit. The benefits 
which result from non-regulation by OSHA (lower production costs) 
go primarily to employers and consumers. So, there will be instances 
when the Commission's decision not to regulate a product that 
creates a risk of injury will actually benefit the consumers using that 
product. However, workers are not likely to benefit from OSHA's 
decision not to regulate a toxic substance which creates a risk of 
material health impairment.233 
By focusing solely on statutory purposes, the Fifth Circuit 
neglected the practical differences which distinguish regulation of 
hazardous consumer products from regulation of hazardous work-
place conditions. Thus, the court's reasoning was unconvincing. 
Because Congress included "unreasonable risk" language in the 
CPSA but not in the Act, the more plausible conclusion is that Con-
gress recognized these practical differences and therefore imposed 
different statutory requirements upon the Commission than it im-
posed upon OSHA. 
c. Did the Fifth Circuit Distinguish its Decision from Those 
Circuit Court Decisions Which Preceded it? 
The Fifth Circuit refused to reconcile its decision with those reached 
by the District of Columbia, the Second, and the Third Circuits. 234 
The court suggested that a critical analysis of this precedent would 
not have been helpful in reviewing the record supporting the 
benzene regulation. Because the earlier cases were decided on their 
own records, the Fifth Circuit determined that the conclusions 
reached by those circuits would shed no light upon the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting the 1 ppm standard.235 
This attempt by the Fifth Circuitto distinguish its opinion from the 
others was unsuccessful. While there were factual differences 
among the records involved, it was nonetheless clear that the three 
circuits did not demand an estimate of the expected benefits from 
the Secretary. The Fifth Circuit required this estimate, and con-
cluded that the Secretary's deduction that the 1 ppm standard would 
achieve some health benefits was not sufficient. 
232. 617 F.2d 636,665 n.169 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
233. Comment, Assessing Regulatory Costs and Benefits: Fifth Circuit Vacates OSHA 
Benzene Standard, 8 ENVIR. L. REP. 10250, 10254 (1978). 
234. 581 F.2d 493, 505 (5th Cir. 1978). 
235. Id. 
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With this decision, a split developed between the Fifth Circuit on 
one hand, and the District of Columbia, the Second, and the Third 
Circuits on the other. On writ of certiorari, the United States 
Supreme Court agreed to review the Fifth Circuit's decision. 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN Industrial Union 
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute 
In reviewing the Fifth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court was 
confronted with the following question: were the findings made by 
the Secretary sufficient to justify a reduction of the permissible ex-
posure limit for benzene from 10 ppm to 1 ppm? To address the ques-
tion, the Court had to consider the split between the Fifth Circuit 
and the other three circuits. That split suggested alternative ap-
proaches to reviewing the inconclusive scientific evidence upon 
which the Secretary based the benzene regulation. The Supreme 
Court was obliged to determine whether to require an estimate of 
the expected benefits, or to allow the Secretary to promulgate the 1 
ppm standard on the basis of the finding that a reduction in exposure 
would achieve some health benefits. 
The plurality, whose opinion was written by Justice Stevens and 
joined in by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, opted for an 
approach closer to the former. The plurality found in section 3(8) a 
threshold requirement that the Secretary must meet prior to pro-
mulgating a standard under section 6(bX5). The plurality determined 
that the Secretary must find that the toxic substance under con-
sideration creates a significant risk of harm in the workplace at the 
present exposure limit.236 Like the Fifth Circuit, the plurality con-
strued section 3(8) to limit the Secretary's standard-setting authori-
ty under section 6(bX5). Also like the Fifth Circuit, the plurality re-
quired greater factual evidence than was available in the record sup-
porting the benzene regulation. 
The dissent, written by Justice Marshall and joined in by Justices 
Brennan, White, and Blackmun, adopted the approach used by the 
District of Columbia, the Second, and the Third Circuits. Disputing 
both the plurality's application of section 3(8) to section 6(bX5) and 
its interpretation of section 3(8), the dissent concluded that the 
Secretary's findings were sufficient to support the 1 ppm 
standard.237 Since the Secretary found that the 1 ppm standard 
236. 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
237. [d. at 706 (dissenting opinion). 
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would better protect the workers against the leukemia hazard posed 
by benzene exposure, the dissent was convinced that the regulation 
should not be postponed. 238 
As a result, the plurality and the dissent reached different conclu-
sions about the validity of the 1 ppm standard. The former, consist-
ing of three Justices, found that the Secretary exceeded his 
statutory authority in promulgating the 1 ppm standard.239 The lat-
ter, consisting of four Justices, concluded that he acted within his 
authority.240 Justice Powell filed a separate opinion, in which he con-
curred in part with the plurality's reasoning and with its 
judgment. 241 Justice Rehnquist, in a separate opinion, concurred in 
the plurality's judgment as well.242 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit's 
decision setting aside the 1 ppm standard was affirmed.243 
The Supreme Court refused to consider the Fifth Circuit's conclu-
sion that the Act requires the Secretary to establish that a reason-
able relationship exists between the expected costs and benefits of a 
regulation. The plurality found that the Secretary had not made the 
required threshold finding that exposure to benzene at a 10 ppm 
level creates a significant risk of leukemia.244 This necessarily meant 
that the Secretary lacked the statutory authority to promulgate a 
lower standard for benzene. There was therefore no reason for the 
plurality to decide whether the Act imposes the further requirement 
of a reasonable relationship between costs and benefits. 245 
Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall each examined the record 
upon which the Secretary based the benzene regulation. While these 
Justices displayed different attitudes toward this evidence, they ac-
cepted all the findings made by the Secretary. 246 Despite this, they 
238. [d. at 707·08 (dissenting opinion). 
239. [d. at 659 (plurality opinion). 
240. [d. at 707·08 (dissenting opinion). 
241. [d. at 664 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
242. Because Justice Rehnquist's opinion did not focus on the principal issues which divided 
the plurality and the dissent, it will not be discussed in any detail. Justice Rehnquist would in· 
validate the first sentence of section 6(bX5) of the Act, finding it to be an "unconstitutional 
delegation[ ] of legislative authority." [d. at 672. As a result, Justice Rehnquist concurred in 
the judgment setting aside the 1 ppm standard for benzene. 
243. [d. at 662 (plurality opinion). 
244. [d. at 653 (plurality opinion). 
245. [d. at 615, 639·40 (plurality opinion); id. at 720 (dissenting opinion). The Supreme 
Court has concluded that the Act does not require a cost·benefit analysis. American Textile 
Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 49 U.S.L.W. 4720 (1981). 
246. Justice Stevens emphasized that even though the record supporting the benzene regu· 
lation had been more thoroughly searched than is customary, he had rejected none of the 
Secretary's factual findings. 448 U.S. 607, 658·59 (1980) (pluraiity opinion). He expressed "no 
opinion on what factual findings this record might support." [d. at 659. 
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reached different conclusions about the validity of the 1 ppm stand-
ard. Their different conclusions about the validity of the 1 ppm 
standard were the result of their disagreement over the prerequi-
sites to regulation which the Act imposes upon the Secretary. 
A. The Plurality's Reasoning 
For the plurality, Justice Stevens interpreted the Act to require 
the Secretary to establish, as a threshold matter, that the toxic sub-
stance under consideration creates a significant health risk at the 
present exposure limit. The benzene regulation was set aside 
because the record did not establish, factually, that 10 ppm exposure 
to benzene creates a significant risk of leukemia. 
The plurality's holding was primarily based on its construction of 
sections 3(8) and 6(b)(5) of the Act. Justice Stevens determined that 
section 3(8) applies to section 6(b)(5).247 Unless the Secretary can 
establish that a section 6(b)(5) standard is "reasonably necessary or 
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment or places of 
employment," he is without statutory authority to enact it.248 
Because of section 3(8)'s language ("to provide" safe workplaces), 
Justice Stevens concluded that section 3(8) implicitly requires the 
Secretary to find, before regulating, that workplaces are not safe.249 
As Justice Stevens understood Congress' intent, "safe" is not de-
fined as risk-free. Since everyday activities are considered safe even 
though they create some risk of material health impairment (e.g., 
driving a car), a workplace is not rendered unsafe simply because it 
presents some risk of harm. For purposes of the Act, Justice Stevens 
concluded that a workplace is not unsafe unless it poses a significant 
health risk to workers.25o 
Justice Stevens' definition of "safe" was necessary to his reason-
ing because safe workplaces represent the goal at which the Secre-
tary is to aim as he promulgates standards. A standard cannot be 
"reasonably necessary or appropriate" to provide safe workplaces 
Justice Stevens concluded that the Secretary based the 1 ppm standard on assumptions and 
on "a special policy for carcinogens." Id. Justice Marshall concluded that when the Secretary 
reduced benzene exposure to 1 ppm, he relied on findings which were supported by substantial 
evidence.ld. at 689 (dissenting opinion). Nonetheless, as noted in the text, the actual dispute 
between the plurality and the dissent focused on the prerequisites to regulation imposed by the 
Act, not on whether substantial evidence supported the Secretary's determinations. 
247. Id. at 614-15,639 (plurality opinion). 
248. Id. at 639-40 (plurality opinion). 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976). 
249. 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
250. Id. 
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when workplaces are not yet unsafe. The Secretary's threshold 
responsibility is to ensure that his standards are in fact addressing 
significant risks of harm. 
Justice Stevens' reading of section 3(8) was not precisely the same 
as the interpretation adopted by the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit 
found in the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" clause itself a 
threshold requirement that the Secretary must meet prior to regula-
tion. 251 Justice Stevens found his threshold requirement in the word 
"safe" used in section 3(8). Justice Stevens did not set aside the 1 
ppm standard because the Secretary failed to weigh costs and bene-
fits as may be required by the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" 
clause. He set it aside because the Secretary failed to find that a 10 
ppm exposure limit for benzene meant that workplaces were not 
"safe," as defined under the Act. 252 
Justice Stevens read section 3(8) of the Act as if its language were 
similar to the language of sections 7(a) and 9(c) of the CPSA. Under 
those provisions, a showing of unreasonable risk is necessary to 
establish that a Commission regulation is "reasonably necessary to 
prevent or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury associated with [a 
consumer] product."253 Justice Stevens determined that under sec-
tion 3(8), a showing of significant risk is necessary to establish that 
an OSHA regulation is "reasonably necessary or appropriate to pro-
vide safe or healthful employment and places of employment. "254 If 
Justice Stevens' definition of "safe" is inserted into section 3(8), that 
section becomes an approximation of sections 7(a) and 9(c) of the 
CPSA. Section 3(8) would read: "reasonably necessary or ap-
propriate to eliminate or reduce a significant risk of harm associated 
with employment and places of employment." So, because of his 
definition of "safe," Justice Stevens read section 3(8) as if Congress 
had expressly required that a certain level of risk exist before the 
Secretary can validly promulgate a regulation. 
This discussion is not meant to suggest that Justice Stevens was 
implicitly calling for the Secretary to make a cost-benefit analysis 
similar to the one imposed upon the Commission. Justice Stevens 
determined that the Act requires the Secretary to find a significant 
risk prior to regulation, but indicated that the threshold finding 
would not require a cost-benefit analysis. 
251. 581 F.2d 493, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1978). See text at notes 196-98 supra. 
252. 448 U.S. 607, 653 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
253. 15 U.S.C. § 2056(aXl) (1976). 
254. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976). 
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Justice Stevens refused to suggest what factual determinations 
would allow the Secretary to conclude that a significant risk of harm 
is present in the workplace.255 However, Justice Stevens did supply 
two general guidelines, and they indicated that he was aware of the 
fact that OSHA is unable to completely ground its regulation of occu-
pational carcinogens upon conclusive factual determinations. 
However, other language in his opinion points in the opposite direc-
tion, suggesting that the Court may require factual findings concern-
ing the risk which are presently beyond OSHA's reach. 
The first guideline invoked by Justice Stevens portrayed the 
threshold requirement as "not a mathematical straitjacket."256 
Justice Stevens indicated that the Secretary is not required to pin-
point exactly the probability of harm created by the substance which 
is to be regulated. Also, once the risk is adequately estimated, the 
Secretary must decide whether that risk is "significant." Justice 
Stevens understood that when the Secretary characterizes a par-
ticular risk as significant or insignificant, he must rely primarily on 
policy considerations.257 
So, Justice Stevens would allow the Secretary to use policy judg-
ments after the risk has been estimated. However, Justice Stevens 
suggested that when the risk is estimated, the required degree of 
factual certainty may be considerable. First, Justice Stevens empha-
sized the absence in the record supporting the benzene regulation of 
any finding that exposure to a 10 ppm level of benzene had even once 
caused leukemia. 258 He indicated that the Secretary would have to 
wait and gather more factual evidence showing a risk of leukemia at 
10 ppm, rather than assume, because of benzene's carcinogenicity, 
that 10 ppm exposure creates some risk. Second, Justice Stevens 
determined that OSHA has the burden of proving, "on the basis of 
substantial evidence, that it is at least more likely than not" that pro-
longed exposure to benzene at a 10 ppm level presents a significant 
health risk.259 This language suggests that a factual finding would be 
required, one which estimates with some precision the extent and 
likelihood of the risk created by 10 ppm exposure. Finally, Justice 
255. 448 u.s. 607, 659 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
256. [d. at 655 (plurality opinion). 
257. [d. at 655·56 n.62 (plurality opinion). 
258. [d. at 634 (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens also quoted with approval the Fifth Cir· 
cuit, which wrote that OSHA was "unable to point to any empirical evidence documenting a 
leukemia risk at 10 ppm." 581 F.2d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 1978). 
259. 448 U.S. 607, 653 (1980) (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens added that "OSHA did not 
even attempt to carry its burden of proof." [d. 
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Stevens implied that he would demand that the risk "be quantified 
sufficiently to enable the Secretary to characterize it as significant in 
an understandable way."260 This requirement would have the 
greatest impact on the Secretary's regulatory discretion. Since the 
benzene record did not permit a quantification of risk, the Secretary 
would be precluded from regulating this carcinogen until much more 
extensive data becomes available. 
On the other hand, there was also a suggestion in the plurality 
opinion that the Secretary may be able to satisfy the threshold re-
quirement with the evidence available in the benzene record. Justice 
Stevens pointed to the "fair amount of epidemiological evidence" 
available, and suggested that even though it may not allow a "pre-
cise correlation between exposure levels and cancer risks, it would at 
least be helpful in determining whether it is more likely than not that 
there is a significant risk at 10 ppm."261 Justice Stevens indicated 
that if the Secretary had used the record fully, he might have been 
able to estimate the leukemia risk at 10 ppm, and then convince the 
Court that the risk was significant. Presumably, Justice Stevens 
would not require more than a very rough quantification of the risk. 
In this form, the threshold requirement would not as severely handi-
cap the Secretary as he sets standards for occupational carcinogens. 
The second guideline Justice Stevens used to describe the thresh-
old finding was also somewhat inconsistent with other language in 
his opinion. Justice Stevens would allow the Secretary to find a 
significant risk without achieving scientific certainty.262 When inter-
preting data relating to carcinogens, the Secretary may adopt con-
servative assumptions which have reputable, although not unani-
mous, scientific support. Justice Stevens determined that this ap-
proach would be valid even though it creates a risk of overprotection, 
in that the Secretary might be led to promulgate regulations that are 
more stringent than is required to protect worker health.263 
Justice Stevens' second guideline appears to encompass the Secre-
tary's reasoning as he selected the 1 ppm standard for benzene. The 
Secretary used certain assumptions for which there was consider-
able scientific support. However, Justice Stevens set aside the 1 ppm 
standard precisely because it was based on these assumptions.264 
260. Id. at 646 (plurality opinion). 
261. Id. at 657 n.64 (plurality opinion). 
262. Id. at 656 (plurality opinion). 
263. Id. (plurality opinion). 
264. Id. at 634, 659 (plurality opinion). 
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Justice Stevens did not allow the Secretary to assume that any ex-
posure level to benzene above 0 ppm creates a leukemia risk suffi-
cient to justify a reduction of the permissible exposure limit to 1 
ppm. Presumably, therefore, Justice Stevens would require a quanti-
fication of the risk at 10 ppm, but would allow the Secretary to use 
conservative assumptions as he makes that quantification. If this is 
the case, the Secretary would still be obliged to do what he concluded 
could not be reliably done on the basis of the benzene record.265 
Because of the conflicting language in Justice Stevens' opinion, 
the impact of the threshold requirement cannot be assessed with cer-
tainty. It would appear, however, that in order to satisfy the require-
ment, the Secretary will need more facts than were available in the 
record supporting the benzene regulation. 
B. The Dissent's Reasoning 
In his dissent, Justice Marshall concluded that the threshold re-
quirement established by the plurality was a fabrication that was 
contrary to the congressional intent expressed in the Act.266 Justice 
Marshall's disposition of the case recalled the approach used by the 
District of Columbia, the Second, and the Third Circuits. 
Justice Marshall determined that judicial review under the sub-
stantial evidence standard prescribed by section 6(f) "is ultimately 
deferential."267 He criticized the plurality for being insensitive to 
three factors which make the application of section 6(f) to an OSHA 
standard very difficult. First, such standards frequently present 
issues of great technical complexity, for which the courts are not 
well-prepared. Second, the standards often involve factual issues 
which are beyond definitive resolution. Finally, policy judgments are 
invariably a part of the Secretary's decision making. This com-
plicates a court's review because policy judgments cannot be evalu-
ated solely on the basis of the factual record. For these reasons, 
Justice Marshall concluded that judicial review must be limited in 
scope, ensuring only that the Secretary's decision making was rea-
sonable and within the statutory boundaries imposed by Congress.268 
265. Justice Marshall argued that a quantification of the risk at 10 ppm could only be made 
"on the basis of assumptions that must be considered too speculative to support any realistic 
assessment of the relevant risk." [d. at 716 (dissenting opinion). See McGarity, supra note 46, 
at 806. 
266. 448 U.S. 607, 708 (1980) (dissenting opinion). 
267. [d. at 705 (dissenting opinion). 
268. [d. (dissenting opinion). 
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Applying this standard of review to the Secretary's benzene regu-
lation, Justice Marshall found that the reduction to 1 ppm was 
authorized by section 6(bX5).269 He noted that the Secretary's find-
ings were left intact by both the Fifth Circuit and the plurality, and 
determined that they adequately supported the Secretary's conclu-
sion that the reduction would save an unknown but possibly substan-
tial number of lives. Justice Marshall required no quantification of 
the expected benefits. He found no statutory language that would 
prevent the Secretary from regulating when he knows that a stand-
ard would improve protection of worker health, but does not know 
the extent of that improvement.27o 
C. Principal Questions of Statutory Construction 
Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall had different answers for the 
two questions of statutory construction which arose in Industrial 
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute. The 
first question was whether section 3(8) applies to section 6(bX5), and 
the second concerned the proper interpretation of section 3(8). 
1. Does Section 3(8) Apply to Section 6(b )(5)? 
Justice Stevens' primary argument in support of his conclusion 
that section 3(8) applies to section 6(b)(5) was not convincing. He 
argued that section 3(8)'s definition of an occupational safety and 
health standard is incorporated by reference into section 6(b )(5). Ac-
cordingly, like any other permanent standard promulgated under 
the Act, section 6(b )(5) standards must address significant risks of 
harm.271 
Justice Marshall's reasons for finding that section 3(8) does not ap-
ply to section 6(bX5) were more cogent. Justice Marshall argued that 
section 3(8) may indeed impose some sort of requirement upon the 
Secretary, but it does not follow that this requirement overrides the 
requirements specifically setout in the first sentence of section 
6(b )(5).272 That sentence states that in the area of toxic material 
269. ld. (dissenting opinion). 
270. ld. at 707-08 (dissenting opinion). 
271. ld. at 642 (plurality opinion). 
272. ld. at 710 (dissenting opinion). Justice Marshall wrote that "the most elementary prin-
ciples of statutory construction demonstrate that precisely the opposite interpretation is ap-
propriate." ld. Justice Marshall meant that the specific requirements in § 6(b)(5) should over-
ride any requirement that § 3(8) may impose. 
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regulation, the Secretary has the duty to "set the standard which 
most adequately assures, to the extent feasible . . . that no em-
ployee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capac-
ity" because of occupational exposure.273 This unique duty arises 
only when the Secretary promulgates regulations of toxic materials. 
Thus, section 6(b)(5)'s requirements appear to be unaffected by other 
requirements which may exist in the Act. 
By imposing section 3(8)'s threshold requirement upon the Secre-
tary whenever he promulgates any permanent standard under the 
Act, the plurality undercut to some extent the force of section 
6(b)(5)'s first sentence. The initial obligation the Secretary must 
fulfill under section 6(bX5) is now the same as it is when he regulates 
a non-toxic substance.274 This result cannot be comfortably recon-
ciled with Congress' inclusion of a standard-setting provision that 
deals only with toxic materials. 
Purely from the standpoint of the Act's structure, the dissent's 
position is more appropriate. The question whether the Secretary 
had the statutory authority to promulgate the 1 ppm standard for 
benzene should have been answered on the basis of the language in 
section 6(b X5). The dispute over whether section 3(8) applies to sec-
tion 6(b X5) assumed greater significance in light of the plurality's in-
terpretation of section 3(8). 
2. What Does Section 3(8) Require? 
Justice Stevens interpreted section 3(8) to require the Secretary to 
find, as a threshold matter, that a significant risk of harm exists in 
the workplace. This interpretation was based primarily on Justice 
Stevens' perception of the congressional intent behind the Act. 275 
273. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
274. Because of this, Justice Marshall concluded that "the test for standards regulating 
toxic substances and harmful physical agents [is now] substantially identical to the test for 
standards generally-plainly the opposite of what Congress intended." 448 U.S. 607, 709 
(1980) (dissenting opinion). Justice Stevens agreed that the threshold requirement is now the 
same for any permanellt standard promulgated under the Act. He added that § 6(b)(5)'s first 
sentence compels the Secretary to adopt a "highly protective standard" once he has satisfied 
the threshold requirement. Id. at 643 nA8 (plurality opinion). 
Justice Marshall's suggestion that the plurality's threshold requirement "renders utterly 
superfluous the first sentence of § 6(b)(5)" is exaggerated. Id. at 709 (dissenting opinion). As 
noted in the text, the threshold requirement does change the character of § 6(b)(5)'s first 
sentence. However, as Justice Stevens stated, that sentence is not altogether eliminated from 
the Act because it still compels the selection of highly protective standards after the threshold 
requirement is met. 
275. Id. at 641 (plurality opinion). Congress' intent will be discussed in the following subsec-
tion. 
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In addition to disputing Justice Stevens' perception of Congress' 
intent,276 Justice Marshall found no precedent to support Justice 
Stevens' interpretation of section 3(8). "Reasonably necessary or ap-
propriate" clauses, like that in section 3(8), are included in 
regulatory statutes as a matter of routine. Justice Marshall noted 
that prior to the plurality's decision, the Supreme Court had held 
consistently that these clauses require a reasonable relationship be-
tween an agency's regulatory actions and the congressional pur-
poses expressed in the statute's substantive provisions.277 Under 
this view, section 3(8) does not establish a requirement that the 
Secretary must meet in addition to the requirements found in section 
6(bX5). Justice Marshall determined that section 3(8) would be 
satisfied whenever the Secretary reasonably concluded that a sec-
tion 6(b )(5) standard would "most adequately assure[ ] . . . that no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional 
capacity."278 Justice Marshall concluded that the plurality's interpre-
tation was inconsistent with this precedent, as the plurality found in 
a "reasonably necessary or appropriate" clause a substantive re-
quirement that changes the duty Congress imposed upon the Secre-
tary through a standard-setting provision (i.e., section 6(b)(5».279 
As noted earlier,280 Justice Stevens read section 3(8) as if its 
language were like that in sections 7(a) and 9(c) of the CPSA. Justice 
Stevens suggested that Congress required that an unreasonable risk 
exist before the Commission can regulate, and that a significant risk 
exist before OSHA can regulate. This was inappropriate, because the 
CPSA expressly provides for the regulation of unreasonable risks, 
but the Act does not expressly provide for the regulation of signifi-
cant risks. Congress could have included in the Act a provision re-
quiring regulation of only significant risks. The plurality's argument 
that this requirement was built into the Act by the word "safe" in 
section 3(8) assumes that Congress decided to obscure the threshold 
requirement rather than make it explicit. Because this assumption is 
illogical, the plurality's argument is not persuasive. 
276. Justice Marshall's perception of Congress' intent will be discussed in the following sub-
section. 
277. 448 U.S. 607, 708 (1980) (dissenting opinion). As examples of this construction of 
"reasonably necessary or appropriate" clauses, Justice Marshall cited FCC v. National Citi-
zens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Mourning v. Family Publications Serv-
ice, Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); and Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 393 
U.S. 268 (1969). 
278. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
279. 448 U.S. 607, 709 (1980) (dissenting opinion). 
280. See text at notes 253-54 supra. 
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D. Did Congress Intend that the Secretary Regulate 
only Significant Risks of Harm? 
673 
The plurality imposed the threshold requirement of significant risk 
upon the Secretary because of its perception of the congressional in-
tent reflected in the Act and its legislative history. The dissent ex-
amined the same evidence, and found no support for the plurality's 
conclusion that Congress intended to make a showing of significant 
risk a prerequisite to regulation. 
1. Section 6(bX5)'s Language 
Justice Stevens noted that section 6(bX5) authorizes the Secretary 
to promulgate standards only for toxic chemicals and harmful 
physical agents, not for all chemicals and physical agents.281 Those 
adjectives limit the Secretary's authority since he is first obliged to 
find that the chemical under consideration is toxic. Justice Stevens 
reasoned that since Congress required the Secretary to regulate only 
toxic chemicals under section 6(b X5), it was not inconsistent to find 
that Congress required the Secretary to regulate only significant 
risks under section 3(8).282 
Probably to better effect, Justice Stevens cited other language in 
section 6(b )(5) which he concluded reflects Congress' decision that 
the Secretary should not attempt to completely eliminate all risks 
from all workplaces. Justice Stevens noted that section 6(b)(5)'s first 
sentence283 circumscribes the Secretary's standard-setting authori-
ty. If a risk cannot be feasibly eliminated or does not create a threat 
of material health impairment, the Secretary would exceed his sec-
tion 6(b X5) authority if he promulgated a regulation designed to 
eliminate it. Section 6(bX5),s first sentence also requires the Secre-
tary to regulate "on the basis of the best available evidence," which 
is to consist of "research, demonstrations, experiments, and other 
such information as may be appropriate."284 These clauses indicated 
281. Id. at 642-43 (plurality opinion). 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
282. 448 U.S. 607, 642-43 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
283. The first sentence of section 6(b)(5) reads: 
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful 
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately 
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such 
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the 
period of his working life. 
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
284. Id. 
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to Justice Stevens that Congress wanted the Secretary to base his 
regulatory decisions to the greatest extent possible on factual deter-
minations.285 Finally, section 6(b)(5) directs the Secretary to be aware 
of certain considerations as he sets standards. While "the attain-
ment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the 
employee" is one consideration, others must be "the latest available 
scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the standards, and ex-
perience gained under this and other health and safety laws."286 
Justice Stevens found in this language a congressional instruction to 
the Secretary to consider the significance of the risk before 
regulating under section 6(b)(5), in keeping with the Act's pragmatic 
goal of eliminating or reducing significant risks of harm present in 
the workplace. 287 
Justice Marshall, on the other hand, emphasized the strength of 
the congressional mandate expressed in section 6(b)(5)'s first sen-
tence. Justice Marshall noted that the Secretary is authorized to pro-
tect workers from substances that would cause material impairment 
of health only upon long-term exposure.288 Also, the "best available 
evidence" clause contemplates OSHA regulations based on inconclu-
sive factual records. Justice Marshall reasoned that since scientific 
uncertainty and disagreement are to be expected, Congress intended 
to allow the Secretary to regulate without the benefit of definitive 
data.289 Finally, Justice Marshall indicated that much of the 
language in section 6(b)(5)'s first sentence invests the Secretary with 
particularly strong authority to regulate toxic materials. That 
authority, Justice Marshall concluded, would be unjustifiably re-
duced if the Secretary were required to make a factual finding of 
significant risk before he could regulate.29o 
The language of section 6(b)(5) demands a high degree of protec-
tion for workers. But it also requires that the Secretary rely on as 
much data as possible while setting standards, and consider the costs 
that standards would impose upon industry. As a result, section 
6(b)(5) is ambiguous with respect to whether Congress intended that 
285. 448 U.S. 607, 643 nA8 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
286. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
287. 448 U.S. 607, 643 nA8 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
288. [d. at 693 (dissenting opinion). 
289. [d. Justice Marshall also quoted the Report of the House Committee on Education and 
Labor, which stated: "it is not intended that the Secretary be paralyzed by debate surrounding 
diverse medical opinions." H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970). 
290. 448 U.S. 607, 693 (1980) (dissenting opinion). 
291. S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
292. [d. at 40. 
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the Secretary make a threshold finding of significant risk prior to 
regulation. To determine Congress' intent, the Act's legislative 
history must be considered. 
2. The Act's Legislative History 
The legislative history of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
indicates that Justice Stevens' interpretation of section 3(8) was 
mistaken. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 
reported a bill, S.2193,291 which contained the original version of sec-
tion 6(b )(5). That version was not limited to toxic materials and 
harmful physical agents, and stated that the Secretary is to select 
the standard which most adequately assures that no employee will 
suffer "any" impairment of health or functional capacity.292 On the 
Senate floor, Senator Peter H. Dominick293 strongly criticized this 
provision, claiming that it would require the Secretary to eliminate 
all hazards from all workplaces. Citing the examples of workers in 
Florida exposed to mosquitoes294 and of a streetcar or bus conductor 
exposed to pollution and traffic accidents, Senator Dominick argued 
that some risks associated with employment could not be eliminated 
unless the Secretary forbade workers from performing those jobs. 
The Secretary would be faced with an impossible choice, having to 
either forbid certain types of employment or ignore Congress' com-
mand as expressed in the provision.295 Consequently, Senator 
Dominick advocated deletion of section 6(b)(5) and introduced an 
amendment to that effect. 296 
On the basis of Senator Dominick's criticisms of section 6(b)(5)'s 
original draft, Justice Marshall argued that Congress did not intend 
to invest section 3(8) with the meaning the plurality gave it. Justice 
Marshall noted that when Senator Dominick expressed his concern 
that section 6(b)(5) would require the maintenance of risk-free work-
places, section 3(8) was already a part of S.2193. As the ramifica-
tions of section 6(b)(5) were debated, neither Senator Dominick nor 
any other Senator invoked section 3(8). Justice Marshall reasoned 
that if Congress had intended section 3(8) to modify section 6(b )(5), 
Senator Dominick's criticisms of the latter would have been un-
founded. 297 Since section 3(8) would force the Secretary to refrain 
293. (R.-Colo.) 
294: 448 U.S. 607, 647 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
295. 116 CONGo REC. 37,614 (1970). 
296. Id. 
297. 448 U.S. 607, 710-11 (1980) (dissenting opinion). 
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from regulating insignificant risks, Congress would have had no 
reason to consider whether this draft of section 6(b )(5) required ab-
solute safety.298 
Justice Stevens' rebuttal to this argument was unsatisfactory. He 
conceded that section 3(8), as he construed it, should have made 
Senator Dominick's criticisms unnecessary. Justice Stevens ex-
plained the criticisms by claiming that because Senator Dominick 
was an opponent of the legislation, he "may have exaggerated the 
significance of the problem" created by section 6(b)(5)'s original 
draft.299 If Congress meant to take the unusual step of investing the 
"reasonably necessary or appropriate" provision with substantive 
content, this probably would have become apparent during its con-
sideration of the Act. The debate over section 6(b)(5)'s implications 
provided Congress with a good opportunity to delineate section 
3(8)'s impact. Because this debate occurred, and because section 3(8) 
was not mentioned during it, Congress probably did not intend sec-
tion 3(8) as the plurality read it. 
The legislative history also suggests that section 6(b )(5) was not in-
tended to require the Secretary to promulgate regulations designed 
to eliminate all risks from all workplaces. After initially proposing 
that section 6(b )(5) be eliminated from the Act, Senator Dominick 
revised his amendment after discussing it with the sponsors of 
S.2193. The revised amendment, which was later adopted, altered 
section 6(b)(5)'s scope, limiting it to toxic materials and harmful 
physical agents, and changed the adjective preceding "impairment" 
from "any" to "material." Explaining the purpose of his amend-
ment, Senator Dominick indicated that for certain substances, short-
term exposure may not lead to toxic effects. However, long-term ex-
posure to those same substances could be very dangerous. Senator 
Dominick stated that these long-term effects must be considered 
when section 6(b)(5) standards are set. 300 Senator Williams, a spon-
298. [d. (dissenting opinion). 
299. [d. at 647-48 n.52 (plurality opinion). 
300. Senator Dominick stated: 
It is my understanding, if I may say so, that what we are doing now is to say that the 
Secretary has got to use his best efforts to promulgate the best available standards, 
and in so doing, that he should take into account that anyone working in toxic agents 
or physical agents which might be harmful may be subjected to such conditions for the 
rest of his working life, so that we can get at something which might not be toxic now, 
if he works in it a short time, but if he works in it the rest of his life it might be very 
dangerous; and we want to make sure that such things are taken into consideration in 
establishing standards; is that correct? 
116 CONGo REC. 37,623 (1970). Senator Dominick's question was addressed to Senator 
Williams, who agreed with the explanation. [d. 
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sor of S.2193, agreed with Senator Dominick's interpretation of sec-
tion 6(b X5), as amended. 301 
On the basis of the Dominick amendment, Justice Stevens argued 
that after Congress recognized that absolute safety cannot be 
achieved, it settled on the elimination of significant health risks as an 
appropriate goal. Justice Stevens reasoned that because Congress 
substituted the word "material" for "any" in section 6(b)(5), it in-
tended that the Secretary should not promulgate standards simply 
because he determines that some risk of serious harm exists. 302 He is 
first obliged to consider the significance of that risk. Justice Stevens 
concluded that Congress did not intend for the Secretary to require 
employers to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to reduce or 
eliminate a risk of serious harm that may be insignificant. 303 
Justice Marshall argued that if section 3(8) did not require the 
regulation of only significant risks before the Dominick amendment, 
it could not have acquired that meaning when the amendment was 
adopted. Justice Marshall noted that because Congress made 
statutory modifications in the text of section 6(bX5), section 3(8)'s 
meaning was not affected. 304 While the Dominick amendment may 
support Justice Stevens' perception of Congress' intent, it does not 
directly support his interpretation of section 3(8). 
Justice Marshall advanced his own interpretation of the Dominick 
amendment. He distinguished between material impairment and 
material risk of impairment, suggesting that "material" in section 
6(b)(5) refers to the level of harm, not risk. Justice Marshall argued 
that Congress could have amended section 6(b)(5) to read "material 
risk of impairment" (which would have supported the plurality's in-
terpretation), but chose not to.305 Justice Marshall concluded that 
the substitution of "material" for "any" was made in order to pre-
vent the Secretary from regulating substances that present a threat 
of only insignificant harm.306 
Justice Marshall also suggested that the Dominick amendment 
reflects a congressional decision to provide special protection for 
workers exposed to toxic materials or harmful physical agents. He 
determined that the sponsors of S.2193 convinced Senator Dominick 
301. [d. 
302. 448 u.s. 607, 646-47, 650 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
303. [d. at 651-52 (plurality opinion). 
304. [d. at 711 (dissenting opinion). 
305. [d. at 720-21 n.34 (dissenting opinion). 
306. [d. at 693 (dissenting opinion). See Brief for Federal Parties at 59, Industrial Union 
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
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that the especially strong mandate of section 6(b)(5)-which Senator 
Dominick originally wanted to remove from the Act-is appropriate 
when toxic materials and harmful physical agents are regulated. 
Justice Marshall concluded that Senator Dominick and the sponsors 
of S.2193 reached a legislative compromise, which retained section 
6(b)(5) but restricted its scope.307 
While Justice Marshall's conclusion is plausible, it is largely under-
cut by another statement made by Senator Dominick. While describ-
ing the intent of his amendment, Senator Dominick stated: 
What we were trying to do in the bill-unfortunately, we did not 
have the proper wording or the proper drafting-was to say that 
when we are dealing with toxic agents or physical agents, we 
ought to take such steps as are feasible and practical to provide 
an atmosphere within which a person's health or safety would 
. not be affected.308 
In rebutting Justice Marshall's interpretation of the Dominick 
amendment, Justice Stevens concluded from this statement that the 
amendment does not reflect a congressional determination that 
special protection of workers is needed when toxic materials are 
present in the workplace. Instead, the amendment simply provided 
the words ("toxic materials or harmful physical agents") which the 
Committee had inadvertently left out of S.2193. Justice Stevens 
determined that the section, as amended, reflects Congress' 
awareness of the special problems OSHA faces when it regulates 
health, rather than safety, risks.309 
While the legislative history does not reveal whether Congress in-
tended to require the Secretary to make a threshold finding of 
significant risk, it does justify two conclusions. First, the legislative 
history does not support Justice Stevens' interpretation of section 
3(8). The absence of any mention of that section-especially when 
contrasted to the considerable legislative attention given to section 
6(b)(5)-indicates that Congress did not intend to impose additional 
requirements upon the Secretary through section 3(8). Second, 
Justice Stevens' belief that Congress intended the Act "to require 
the elimination, as far as feasible, of significant risks of harm"310 is 
307. [d. at 448 U.S. 607, 711-12 n.28 (dissenting opinion). 
308. 116 CONGo REC. 37,622 (1970). 
309. 448 U.S. 607, 649 n.54 (1980) (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens noted that Congress, 
in the person of Senator Dominick, outlined the special problems which accompany regulation 
of health risks. See text and note at note 299 supra. Justice Stevens indicated that safety risks 
are "generally immediate and obvious" but health risks may not become apparent until long-
term exposure has occurred. 448 U.S. 607, 649 n.54 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
310. [d. at 641 (plurality opinion). 
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not without support in the legislative history. Senator Dominick's 
criticisms of section 6(b)(5) as originally written, and his "material" 
amendment, reflect a congressional attitude in favor of requiring the 
Secretary to consider the significance of risks before proceeding 
with regulations. These conclusions suggest that Justice Steven's in-
terpretation (i.e., that the Act requires a threshold finding of signifi-
cant risk) would have been more plausible had it been based on sec-
tion 6(b)(5), rather than on section 3(8). 
3. Policy Considerations 
Both Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall cited policy reasons in 
support of their respective conclusions about whether the Secretary 
must make a threshold finding of significant risk prior to regulation. 
Justice Stevens was justifiably concerned with the likely conse-
quences that would follow a decision to uphold the Secretary's 
benzene regulation. He determined that the Secretary's interpreta-
tion of sections 3(8) and 6(b)(5), along with OSHA's generic approach 
to the regulation of carcinogens, would provide the Secretary with 
"unprecedented power over American industry."311 Once a sub-
stance was identified as a probable carcinogen, the Secretary could 
find that any exposure above 0 ppm creates a risk of cancer. Justice 
Stevens reasoned that on the basis of this "no safe level" finding, the 
Secretary could promulgate sweeping regulations, limited only by 
the requirement that they be technologically and economically feasi-
ble. Considering the great number of workplace substances that are 
believed or suspected to be carcinogenic, Justice Stevens concluded 
that the Secretary could require employers to spend huge sums of 
money for health benefits that may prove to be insignificant. 312 
Similarly, the industry challengers of the benzene regulation 
argued that if the Secretary regulates without first sufficiently iden-
tifying the risks, he will inevitably frustrate the Act's primary pur-
pose, which is to make working conditions safe and healthful "so far 
as possible."313 Employers have limited resources available for 
health and safety purposes. Industry challengers asserted that these 
resources can be used in a way that does the most to ensure that 
311. [d. at 645 (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens indicated that "if the Government were 
correct in arguing that neither § 3(8) nor § 6(b)(5) requires that the risk from a toxic substance 
be quantified sufficiently to enable the Secretary to characterize it as significant in an under-
standable way," the Act might be unconstitutional. So interpreted, the Act might be a too 
"sweeping delegation of legislative power." Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495, 539 (1935). 
312. 448 U.S. 607, 645 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
313. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976). 
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American workplaces are safe and healthful only if the Secretary is 
required to show that his regulations are addressing significant risks 
of harm. 314 
Justice Marshall, on the other hand, invoked a compelling policy 
reason for not requiring the Secretary to quantify the risk created by 
a toxic substance. Requiring quantification would force the Secre-
tary to postpone regulation of those substances which present a 
cancer risk that cannot now be estimated. Justice Marshall noted 
that this "regulatory inaction" would result in the continued ex-
posure of workers to a risk of cancer and other serious diseases.315 
Justice Marshall argued that because the risks presented by some of 
these carcinogens may prove to be significant, employees would have 
to pay the health costs which arise as science gathers more data. This 
result would be at odds with the letter and spirit of the Act, since it 
was intended to protect workers from the dangers created by 
workplace conditions. 316 
E. Justice Powell's Opinion 
In order to assess the potential impact of Industrial Union Depart-
ment, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, it is necessary to 
examine where Justice Powell stood in relation to the dispute be-
tween the plurality and the dissent. Justice Rehnquist filed a sepa-
rate opinion concurring in the plurality's judgment, but based his 
opinion on different grounds.317 
Justice Powell adopted the plurality's interpretation of the 
statutory provisions relevant to this case. He concluded that sections 
3(8) and 6(bX5) are to be read together, and that the Secretary must 
make a threshold finding of significant risk in order to show that a 
regulation is reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe 
workplaces. 318 
Justice Powell also agreed with the plurality that the benzene 
regulation must be set aside if it were based on the assumption that 
occupational exposure to a carcinogen must always be reduced to 
either a safe level, if one is found, or the lowest feasible level. 319 Like 
314. Brief for Respondents at 37,73, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American 
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
315.448 U.S. 607, 714 (1980) (dissenting opinion). 
316. [d. at 690. 
317. See note 242 supra. 
318. 448 U.S. 607, 664-65 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
319. [d. at 665 (powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
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the plurality, Justice Powell would not permit the Secretary to use 
the policy judgment which is the cornerstone of OSHA's generic ap-
proach to the regulation of carcinogens. 
However, Justice Powell disagreed with the plurality's ruling that 
the Secretary made no effort to prove that exposure to benzene at a 
10 ppm level created a significant health risk. Justice Powell deter-
mined that if substantial evidence supported the Secretary's finding 
that the risk at 10 ppm (although unquantifiable) was serious enough 
to warrant the costs of the 1 ppm standard, the threshold require-
ment would be met. 320 Justice Powell concluded that OSHA failed to 
establish that a significant risk existed at 10 ppm.321 He added that 
even if OSHA had established this risk, this would not have been 
enough to sustain the benzene regulation. Like the Fifth Circuit, 
Justice Powell read the Act to require a reasonable relationship be-
tween the costs and expected benefits of an OSHA standard.322 
Like the dissenters, Justice Powell did not find that quantification 
of the risk is a prerequisite to regulation.323 He outlined a two-step 
reviewing process. First, the court must consider whether substan-
tial evidence supported the Secretary's finding that quantification of 
the risk was impossible. Second, if that finding was supported by 
substantial evidence, the court must then determine whether sub-
stantial evidence supported the Secretary's finding of significant 
risk. If quantification was impossible, Justice Powell would allow the 
Secretary to find a significant risk by relying on the weight of expert 
testimony and opinion.324 
VII. POSSIBLE EFFECT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION UPON 
OSHA REGULATIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL CARCINOGENS 
Because of Justice Powell's conclusions, the Supreme Court 
assumed the following configuration in Industrial Union Depart-
ment, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute. First, a majority 
of the Court (the four dissenters and Justice Powell) found that the 
Secretary is not automatically precluded from regulating when he is 
unable to quantify the risk created by exposure to a toxic substance 
at the present limit. Whether the plurality would require quantifica-
tion in every case is uncertain. Second, four Justices (the plurality 
320. Id. at 666 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
321. Id. at 667 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
322. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
323. Id. at 666-67 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
324. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
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and Justice Powell) concluded that the Act requires the Secretary to 
find, prior to regulation, that exposure at the current permissible 
limit presents a significant risk of material health impairment. 
Because the Court split, four to four, on the question whether the 
Secretary must make a threshold finding of significant risk, one can 
only speculate about the effect that this decision will have on OSHA 
regulation of occupational carcinogens. However, one conclusion is 
clear. If the Secretary is indeed required to make this threshold find-
ing, either by quantification or on the weight of expert opinion, the 
generic approach to regulating carcinogens has been undercut. 
That approach is based on a policy judgment which the Secretary 
would no longer be able to use iihe must make a threshold finding of 
significant risk. Presently, the Secretary assumes that if a safe expo-
sure level is not established for a workplace carcinogen, any expo-
sure level above 0 ppm is unsafe because it creates some risk of 
cancer. 
If the threshold requirement must be met, the Secretary will no 
longer be able to assume that exposure at the current permissible 
limit creates a risk of cancer which renders workplaces unsafe and 
requires a reduction of the limit to the lowest feasible level. Instead, 
the Secretary will be obliged to find, on the basis of substantial evi-
dence, that the risk associated with the current limit is significant. 
If quantification is required to make the threshold finding, OSHA 
regulation of occupational carcinogens will be severely weakened. 
Requiring a reliable quantification would result in the indefinite post-
ponement of OSHA regulations for those occupational substances 
which create a risk of cancer at low exposure levels that cannot now 
be estimated. 
If courts permit the Secretary to base a finding of significant risk 
on expert testimony and opinion, the effect on OSHA's ability to 
regulate occupational carcinogens would not be as severe. Unanimi-
ty of scientific opinion would probably not be required. 325 As long as 
a substantial number of scientific experts supports the Secretary's 
325. This approach to weighing expert testimony and opinion was adopted by the Fifth Cir-
cuit. The court wrote: 
The divided opinion in the scientific community over the existence or not of safe 
threshold levels of exposure to carcinogens provides substantial evidence which 
would support the finding that exposure to benzene at the present level of 10 ppm 
poses some leukemia risk. 
American Petroleum Institute v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 581 F.2d 
493, 503 (5th Cir. 1978). Thus, the court did not demand scientific unanimity when it upheld 
the Secretary's finding that exposure to benzene at a 10 ppm level creates some risk of 
leukemia. 
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finding of significant risk, courts would allow the Secretary to 
regulate, even though quantification may be impossible. 
However, even if courts allow expert testimony and opinion to sup-
port a finding of significant risk, the usefulness of OSHA's generic 
approach will still be greatly reduced. The Secretary's policy judg-
ment that any exposure level to benzene above 0 ppm creates some 
risk of leukemia was supported by scientific opinion. However, that 
opinion did not establish that a 10 ppm exposure creates a significant 
risk. More expert testimony and opinion would be required, and that 
evidence must relate specifically to the current permissible exposure 
limit. 
The holding of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals provides an apt 
summation of what it would mean to the Secretary to have to make a 
threshold finding of significant risk. The Fifth Circuit ruled that 
"Congress intended for OSHA to regulate on the basis of more 
knowledge and fewer assumptions than this record [supporting the 
benzene regulation] reflects."326 By requiring the threshold finding, 
four Justices of the Supreme Court agreed. Instead of using a policy 
judgment which assumes that some risk exists, the Secretary will be 
forced to make a factual determination that the risk is significant in 
order to validly promulgate a regulation. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Congress gave 
the Secretary of Labor the authority to set occupational standards, 
and provided that the Secretary's exercise of this authority is to be 
directed toward assuring, so far as possible, that workplaces in 
America will be safe and healthful. This statutory obligation becomes 
especially difficult to meet when carcinogens are present in a 
workplace. In order to reduce the regulatory problems created by oc-
cupational carcinogens, the Secretary adopted a generic approach, 
which allows him to reduce the permissible exposure limit for a car-
cinogen without having to estimate the risks present at low exposure 
levels. 
The courts have struggled to identify how the Secretary can valid-
ly promulgate a standard when the available evidence is incomplete 
and inconclusive. The circuit courts which have addressed this issue 
have reached inconsistent conclusions. The District of Columbia, the 
Second, and the Third Circuits did not require that the Secretary 
326. [d. at 505. 
684 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:623 
estimate the benefits expected from a standard. The Fifth Circuit, 
however, concluded that the Secretary is not authorized to regulate 
until he can make a rough but educated estimate of the expected 
benefits. 
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American 
Petroleum Institute, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit 
decision setting aside the Secretary's regulation which reduced the 
permissible exposure limit for benzene from 10 ppm to 1 ppm. In 
deciding this case, the Court was concerned with two provisions of 
the Act. Those provisions were section 3(8), which defines an occupa-
tional safety and health standard, and section 6(b)(5), which 
describes the duty imposed upon the Secretary when he regulates 
toxic materials or harmful physical agents. 
Four Justices concluded that section 3(8) applies to section 6(b)(5), 
and requires that the Secretary find, as a threshold matter, that 
exposure to a toxic substance at the current permissible exposure 
limit creates a significant risk of material health impairment. Those 
Justices ruled that in promulgating the 1 ppm standard for benzene, 
the Secretary acted without statutory authority because he did not 
find that exposure at the 10 ppm level presents a significant risk of 
leukemia. 
Four Justices vigorously dissented, disputing both the plurality's 
application of section 3(8) to section 6(b)(5) and its interpretation of 
section 3(8). They concluded that the Secretary's inability to quantify 
either the risk at 10 ppm or the expected benefits of the 1 ppm stand-
ard should not prevent the benzene regulation from taking effect. 
The dissenters determined that the regulation was within the Secre-
tary's section 6(b)(5) authority since he found that it would achieve 
some health benefits. 
If this decision causes other courts to require a threshold finding of 
significant risk, the Secretary's ability to regulate occupational car-
cinogens will be weakened. While the Supreme Court did not directly 
consider the validity of the generic approach in the case, its decision 
may greatly reduce the approach's usefulness to the Secretary. 
The Supreme Court decision in Industrial Union Department, 
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute creates even more ques-
tions about how OSHA can validly regulate an occupational carcino-
gen when the available scientific and medical evidence is incon-
clusive. The decision jeopardizes the future effectiveness of OSHA's 
generic approach. Also, while four Justices required a threshold find-
ing of significant risk, they did not adequately instruct the Secretary 
on how to make that finding. Finally, the court refused to consider 
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whether the Act also requires that the expected benefits of a regula-
tion bear a reasonable relationship to its costs. So, the courts have 
yet to delineate the requirements which the Secretary of Labor must 
satisfy in order to validly promulgate a regulation for an occupa-
tional carcinogen on the basis of incomplete and inconclusive 
evidence. 
